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Globalization and the Rise of Militant Islamic Social Movement Organizations: The Case of UAMSHO (Awakening) Group in Zanzibar.

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS:
THE CASE OF UAMSHO (AWAKENING) GROUP IN ZANZIBAR.

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ABSTRACT

Globalization and the Rise of Militant Islamic Social Movement Organizations: The Case of UAMSHO (awakening) group in Zanzibar.

By

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This dissertation set out to explore how specific aspects of globalization affect the growth and development of particular militant neo-fundamentalist social movements and in what ways globalization affect the resources and collective identity of these movements. To examine this, I conducted ethnographic and archival research and in-depth interviews with 40 activists in the UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group in Zanzibar, which is associated with the rise of violent activities since the first multiparty elections, held in 1995. Most of these activities have been associated with the UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group, that adheres to strict neo-fundamentalist views of Islam, and which calls for Zanzibar to secede from Tanzania, the union with the mainland. In this research, I found that in the context of political turmoil and economic challenges, resource flows from both public and private financiers from the Middle-Eastern States, has deeply shaped UAMSHO's collective identity and mobilization patterns that has increasingly emphasized on revolutionary Islamic neo-fundamentalism ideals.

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“Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and lean not on your own understanding, in all your ways acknowledge Him, and He shall direct your paths.” Proverbs 3:5-6

To: Brian, Brandon, and Braiden –You are the **FUTURE**. Thank you for keeping me grounded.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been an increase in militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations worldwide. Much of the literature devoted to understanding the rise of particular groups has focused on the ideology, psychology or other characteristics of individual terrorists (Juergensmeyer 2003, Stern 2003, Krueger and Malecková 2003) or the political situation in particular nations (Schock 1996; Marshall and Gurr 2003). However, understanding how globalization has impacted this growth has been much more difficult. At a large scale, most research shows that global communication and technology, finance and trade blur geographical boundaries in ways that can both integrate and fragment social groups. Friedman argues that globalization increases struggles between prosperity on the one hand, and national desires to preserve tradition and identity on the other (Friedman, 1999). But how do specific aspects of globalization affect the growth and development of particular groups? In what specific ways does globalization affect the resources and collective identity of social movement organizations?

This study will use in-depth interviews with members of a militant neo-fundamentalist group in the early stages of their organization to gain an in-depth understanding how specific aspects of globalization contribute to their resources and collective identity. In particular, I will focus on UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group, the major radical Islamic social movement in Zanzibar.




Figure 1: Maps showing Zanzibar retrieved from <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/tanzania>

Militant neo-fundamentalism in Zanzibar

The tiny semi-autonomous African country of Zanzibar offers a unique setting to explore these questions because of the long history with globalization and its people’s multi-racial identity. Zanzibar has resisted much of the militant organizing that has plagued many other predominantly Islamic nations, despite the central role race and religion have played in Zanzibar’s post-colonial politics. Because of its location along trade routes in the Indian Ocean, Zanzibar has developed a multi-ethnic community, united by a common language (Kiswahili) and religion (Islam). It’s more indigenous Shirazi culture was the result of intermarriage, acculturation and assimilation between these Arab, Persian and African traders prior to the 14th century. Several centuries of colonization by European and Arab nations overlaid more distinct racial, class and nationalist divides among elites. While post-colonial political parties were organized along racial divides, there had been relatively little interethnic conflict compared to

other nations, even as mainland Tanzania's Christian Africans and Zanzibar's Sunni Muslims united in 1963 under single party rule (Le Sage 2014, Becker 2006; Vittori 2009).

Recent party politics has seen a resurgence of identity politics, as labels of African vs. Arab has motivated party rivalries. Since its first multiparty elections in 1995, an increase in violent activities has been associated with not race, but religious extremism in Zanzibar. Most of these activities have been associated with the rise of one group –the UAMSHO, which is said to adhere to strict neo-fundamentalist views of Islam and calls for Zanzibar to secede from the mainland, Tanzania. UAMSHO has been mobilizing Zanzibar's citizens through open air lectures in which popular clerics use the Qur'an to justify violence or breaking the laws. UAMSHO plays on Zanzibar's history of racial and religious identity well, and criticizes the African; Christian dominated ruling party for the high rate of unemployment, social decay, and human rights abuses. Since 2000, UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group has targeted individuals who are non-Muslim, churches, and bars in Zanzibar with increasing violence.

The majority of scholarship on the rise of violence in Zanzibar has focused more narrowly on the political processes involved in multiparty democracy and voting irregularities as they have inspired violence (Mmuya and Chaligha 1993 and 1998; Kalimange 1986; Maliyamkono 2000; Mukangara 2000). Brents and Mshigeni (2004) contended that the cultural and political history of the islands was influential in the formation of racial identity in Zanzibar; a history of inequalities worsened by colonialism, political opportunities, and party organizations that framed the construction of racial and religious identity.

Little attention has been paid by Zanzibari scholars to how the specific aspects of globalization affect the rise of militant activist groups. In this dissertation, I will examine

specific aspects of globalization that UAMSHO actors identify as important to their organization, especially those related in relation to their resources and collective identity. In particular, I found that foreign investments/aid and information technology (use of technology and dissemination of information) affected the resources and collective identity in the early development of the UAMSHO group in Zanzibar.

The phenomenon of the rise of militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations not only in Zanzibar, but elsewhere around the world, brings with it passionate arguments about the nature and role of political Islam in society, and the relation between political Islam, and the rise of militant neo-fundamentalism (Gilsaa 2006; Lodhi and Westerlund 1997). This dissertation aims to add knowledge to this area and help scholars better understand the aspects and forces that contribute to the rise of such violent Islamic social movement organization(s) in Eastern Africa. This dissertation aims to explore the role and impact of globalization, information technology advancement, and Islamic neo-fundamentalism in the rise of violent Islamic social movements in Zanzibar.

Statement of the Problem and Research Question(s)

This research seeks to answer the question: What aspects of globalization are important in explaining the resources and collective identity of UAMSHO as a militant neo-fundamentalist social movement in its early development? After noting the most important aspects that organization actors identified as the key aspects of globalization, I asked several follow up questions.

- I. How have foreign investments and investments by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) influenced and propelled the militant neo-fundamentalist movement organizations in Zanzibar?
- II. What is the role of communication technologies in militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations in Zanzibar?
- III. How have these aspects of globalization affected the collective identity of militant neo-fundamentalist organizations, and what is the relationship between race, religion, and politics in this “new” Islamic social movements in Zanzibar?

To answer these questions, in 2004 I conducted 40 in-depth interviews with members and leaders of two of the largest youth political movements in Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF) and the Blue and White Guards, the vigilante youth arms of the major opposition political party, the Civic United Front (CUF). There were about 15 youth movements in Zanzibar, standing for various principles and social issues. In 2004 the ZYF had 3000 members, 2500 on Zanzibar Island and 500 on Pemba Island, while Blue and White Guards had a total of more than 5000 members. I also gathered field texts from some of the members with whom we did not speak. In the years, since, it became clear that the individuals I interviewed were at that time discussing, and later became the core members of UAMSHO. When I interviewed them in 2004, they identified themselves as members of the Blue Guards, and shortly thereafter they moved discretely into UAMSHO. Therefore, I will refer to this group as UAMSHO in the remainder of this dissertation.

Ethnographic data was gathered over two months at three sites in Zanzibar. The first was at the ZYF offices in the middle of Stone Town at a place called Forodhani, where they gave

me an office space specifically for in-depth interviews during the day. The second site was Jaws Corner at Mkunazini in the middle of the Stone Town, an empty space with benches for members to sit, a folding table with some chairs, plus three huge coffee kettles in a charcoal grill. The setting is surrounded with shops, internet café and game arcades. Blue Guard members gather here, every day after evening prayers, for coffee and informal discussion until 12 or 1 a.m. The third site was the Lebanon Corner at Sokomuhogo, which is similar to Jaws Corner, but the setting is more 'quiet', 'classy' and only high ranked official gather here. They meet twice a week for coffee and donuts after evening prayers and keep each other up to date on the movement by comparing notes with ZYF and the Blue and White Guard.

In addition, I analyzed various official documents, economic and financial reports, charters, policy statements, and speeches by leaders of these groups, and followed their development prior to and since 2004. I looked at historical documents of government and NGOs regarding Zanzibar's political, social, and cultural environment, which may have fostered and encouraged the radicalization of some individuals. In particular, I look at Zanzibar social conditions (i.e., economic, political and cultural), UAMSHO's recruitment and organizational strategies, how activists communicate and use technology, their beliefs about spread of westernization, traditional identities, political Islam, and the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and external funding in helping the UAMSHO's expansion in Zanzibar.

The Zanzibar setting

Zanzibar is home to approximately 1.3 million people today. It is estimated that about 99% are Muslim and the remainder, 1%, are a mixture of Christians and other believers.

Zanzibar consists of many small islands and two major islands of Unguja (informally Zanzibar) and Pemba.

Zanzibar is the main hub of Swahili culture. Since the 9th Century, many Arab Muslim traders married local women, which created a new culture that combined Arabic and native African elements, i.e., Bantus, Pharisesees, Comorians (these are immigrants from Comoro Islands in Indian Ocean) and the people of the small island of Timbuktu. From the 1600s to the 1800s, Zanzibar was colonized by Oman and then in the 1900s Great Britain in a way that set up large social class and ethnic economic disparities.

Zanzibar's mild climate, arable land, and moderate rainfall provided an ideal environment for clove cultivation, which afforded Zanzibar a virtual monopoly on the world clove production. The western sides of both islands, Unguja and Pemba, have deep soil that favor clove cultivation. The clove trade was first introduced by the Omani, and subsequent economic development elevated these Arab immigrants to large landholdings. The Omani also operated a large slave trade that brought mainland Africans to the island. The complex political tensions between these later arriving Arab, African and more indigenous intermixed Shirazi created the foundations for the political conflicts that plague the island today.

In 1963 Zanzibar gained its independence from British rule and Zanzibar united with Tanganyika to become Tanzania. However, in the revolution many of the Arabs were killed or forced to flee the islands and Africans from the mainland dominated the politics. The Arabs

who stayed behind transformed from privileged minorities into second-class citizens; the ruling government excluded them from government jobs and confiscated their land and all of their property (Bakari 2001; Burgess 2009).

Zanzibar's Political Environment

A revolution in 1964 brought the present government into power after ASP and its youth revolutionaries overthrew the Sultan and the formed Arab government. Therefore, the current political environment in Zanzibar presents an antithesis to the struggle for independence. Eventually, in 1963, the British colonial masters granted independence to Zanzibar, although the move did not help solving the already solid political and social fractures along class, ethnic, regional, and racial lines entrenched in the country through a colonial set political economy (Mukangara 2000; Burgess 2009). The conflicts along class, ethnic, regional, and religious lines seem to be so strong that even the 1964 revolution that overthrew the Sultanate of Oman and his Arab dominated rule could not reverse them (Bakari 2001).

According to Burgess (2009), about one-third of the Arabs who resided in Zanzibar's main Island of Unguja were killed or forced to flee the islands and Africans from the mainland dominated the politics. The Arabs who stayed behind transformed from privileged minorities into second-class citizens; the ruling government excluded them from government jobs and confiscated their land and all of their property (Bakari 2001; Burgess 2009).

While political divisions along ethnic, racial, and religious lines are high, the level of social mingling between people of various racial, ethnic, or regional backgrounds has always also been high (Bakari 2001). Nonetheless, from the first multiparty elections in 1995, 2000

and 2005, Zanzibar was marred by political violence, especially between the two main parties, the Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama Cha Mapinduzi ((CCM) or translated as the Revolutionary Party). This was due to the fact that CUF members claimed that the CCM had rigged the elections and refused to accept the results, resorting to violence (Malipula 2003; Minde 2014). The conflict led to several years of negotiations between the CUF and CCM, resulting in the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) in July 2010 (Sheriff 2001; Malipula 2003). After the CUF joined, the GNU lost its appeal to the majority of its supporters, and this allowed a group known as UAMSHO to capitalize on the political vacuum and advocate for the same issues once endorsed by the CUF platform, including calling for an independent Zanzibar.

UAMSHO was formed by popular clerics who were said to be part of the CUF Blue Guards (The African Report 07/12/2012). According to Koenings (2015), UAMSHO's founding clerics succeeded in gaining support in Zanzibar due to the CCM government's relentless suppression of the CUF, which is considered by many to be an all-inclusive political party founded by intellectuals, farmers, business people and human rights activists (www.Theafricanarguments.org 10/02/2015). The clerics who formed UAMSHO began offering public sermons in the 1990s, with no formal organizational structure or leadership hierarchy, but by mid-2011 they had totally transitioned from the CUF Blue Guard into a religious organization with a clear leadership hierarchy, a constitution, and a political platform (The Economist 11/02/2012, The Financial Times 12/28/2012, World Watch Monitor 03/17/2014).

In the period since UAMSHO arrived in the political picture in Zanzibar to fill the opposition vacuum left by CUF, acts of violence against Christians and non-believers have

grown. UAMSHO not only advocates secession from the Union government but also wants to turn Zanzibar into an Islamic State that is built on sharia law. Radicalized UAMSHO activists are believed to have set churches on fire, destroyed properties, and killed several Christian priests.

Outline of Dissertation

I have divided this dissertation into eight chapters plus an appendix section. This first chapter provides an introduction to the phenomenon of the rise of militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations, particularly in Zanzibar, the rationale for the study, and the research questions. In the second chapter, I will provide a comprehensive review of the literature. The third chapter is dedicated to the description of my research method, including sampling, data collection, how the data was analyzed, validity issues, potential ethical considerations, and the role and background of the researcher. In the fourth chapter, I will give a brief history to the Zanzibar's political, religious and racial background and the UAMSHO group, who they are, when they arose, their general claims, and their stated goals. In the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters I will present my findings and analysis in terms of the major themes that emerged from my data, accompanied by quotes from the interviews and secondary data from quantitative studies. In the last chapter I will discuss my primary conclusions, as well as implications of the study, future research, limitations of the study, and a conclusion section. The appendix section will include copies of Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from UNLV, the informed consent forms in English and Swahili, and the demographic questionnaire.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In this chapter I will review recent research pertaining to my question: What aspects of globalization are important in explaining the resources and collective identity of militant fundamentalist organizations? I have divided this chapter into four sections. The first part is the review of the social movements' theories literature. In the second part I have focused attention to the globalization literature, which is divided into three sections highlighting the general definition of globalization, discussing the literature on the positive/integrative consequences of globalization, and discussing the fragmenting/disruptive consequences of globalization. The third section of this chapter begins with a discussion of research on globalization and its affects in East Africa. I then discuss research on the major factors of globalization that my interviewees identified as central: funding (foreign aid/investment and NGOs) and the use of technology, as related to Tanzania and Zanzibar. Finally, I discuss the literature on the rise of Islamic neo-fundamentalism as a response to globalization.

Resources, Collective Identity and Social Movements

In order to understand the development of UAMSHO I rely on research on social movements, particularly scholarship that points to the importance of resources to the development of social movement organizations. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) point out that resource mobilization is significant to the emergence and success of social movement

organizations. These scholars have argued that grievances alone are not sufficient in explaining the emergence of social movement organizations. For example, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) stressed that grievances always persist in societies and alone are not sufficient in explaining social movement mobilization. That is, grievances are a necessary but not sufficient cause for social movement organization, action, and persistence (Jenkins 1983; Metzger 2005).

Edwards and McCarthy (2004) describe resources as those things that are essential to social movement organizations such as financial support, networks, human capital meaning enough members with different skill levels to move the movement forward and organizational structure. For Jenkins (1983) the fundamental issue for collective action is the availability of resources for mobilization purposes and the way these resources are organized. The formation of organizational capacity can help in uniting activists, looking for material contributions, and validating collective action, hence the organizational capacity is considered invaluable in sustaining contention (Oberschall 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982 and Tarrow 1998). Therefore, militant Islamic social movement organizations, like other social movement organizations, mobilize resources through communication, specifically the new information technology, dividing labor, and importantly, from outside movement financing (Meijer 2005). In this case, Meijer (2005) argues that militant Islamic social movement organizations can mobilize their resources in three different ways: 1) following the formal political mobilization make up of political parties and legal institutions; 2) the legal environment of civil society in the form of NGOs, medical clinics, charity societies, schools, and professional organizations; or 3) the informal sector of social networks and personal ties.

Other social movement scholars focus on the importance of collective identity in the development of movement organizations. Collective identity can be summed up as person's sense of belonging to a group where the identity of the group becomes part of the individual (Taylor and Whittier 1992, Melucci 1996, Taylor and Rupp 1999). Further, Melucci (1996) describes collective identity as a process of "constructing" an action system, whereby the process is interactive and there is a shared definition that is created by a number of different individuals in the group. Collective identity is important because it acts as a means to connect or link individuals and a group where the said individual participates on the shared common interests. In this dissertation, then, I will examine the relationship between resource mobilization and collective identity in the UAMSHO social movement organization to understand the impact of globalization on the movements' development.

Globalization

Globalization is a complex concept that different scholars have attempted to define. That being said, no single definition exists for the term globalization, though there are a variety of depictions from different scholars such as Jameson 1991; Johnston et al 1995; Held et al 1999; Albrow 1996; Giddens 1990; Robertson 1992; Kofman and Youngs 1996; Zurn 1995 and Scholte 1993. According to Brahm 2002, most scholars have differing approaches to addressing the many facets of globalization and its evolving interdependence, which can be in any aspect such as technology, culture, or economy.

However, globalization in its simplest form can allude to growing interdependence and interconnectedness (Brahm 2002). Further, this can mean there is expansion of a global flow of

goods and services to the point where all levels of human organization are blended together as one system (Brahm 2002). Additionally, there is an increasing level of interactions on the intercontinental and interregional scale where space is said to be broken down, where there are no barriers (Brahm 2002).

In defining globalization, Steger (2009) adopted the term globality to imply a social condition characterized by tight global cultural, political, environmental, and economic interconnections and flows that make most of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant. He warns that we should not assume that this phenomenon of globality is upon us or that it denotes a determinate endpoint that precludes any further development. Therefore, for Steger (2009), the term globalization applies to a set of social processes that appear to transform our present social condition of weakening nationality into one of globality.

Integrative Consequences of Globalization

For Fukuyama (1989); Friedman (1999); Giddens (2000), globalization's manifestation and processes suggest a remarkable prospect for democracy, peace, and prosperity. Hence, globalization is mostly tied to economic liberalism where there is a suggestion of the rise of a new international division of labor (Amin 1997; Castells 1998; Dicken 1998; Hoogvelt 1997; Johnston et al. 1995; Mittleman 2000; Rodrik 1997). Additionally, Dicken (1998) and Castells (1996) suggest that the current emerging economies around the world have been aided by globalization, and have increasingly been part of global trade and capital flow. Therefore, some scholars such as Dicken (1998); Dickson (1997); Frank (1998); Geyer and Bright (1995), conclude that the world is now one world economy.

Globalization can be said to be integration of the world in all spheres, not only in terms of the world economy, but also politics and the arts, where the vast differences between cultures and/or people have been reduced. Simply stated, globalization permits citizens and nations to contribute to general understandings, events, and values in real time due to the progress made in communication and information technology that has shrunk the world in terms of space and time. Held and McGrew (2007) describe globalization as an ongoing structural shift in the organization of human affairs from a world of discrete but interdependent nation-states to the world as a shared social space.

Beyond the faster paced movements of goods and people, advancements in communication (i.e., social media, including easily accessible emailing and cheap telephone services) technologies have created a whole visual and accessible world that never existed before. Some globalization advocates promote this as a new and better way of supporting the universal objectives of economic collaboration, civil society, and good governance (Tibi 1998). Steger (2009) adopted the label 'globality' to indicate a phenomenon distinguished and influenced by environmental interconnections, and tight political, economic, cultural global flows of goods and services that make irrelevant most current nations' boundaries and borders.

Dicken (1998), Castells (1996), Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) see globalization as a catalyst to increased capital flows, as production processes have been increasingly distributed not only at the global level but also regionally. Additionally, Dicken (1998), Anderson and Blackhurst (1993) point to the phenomenon of increased regional integration as an accompaniment to globalization and not a counterforce to it. Further, Castells (1996) and Dicken (1998) point at the positive forces of globalization not only in the developed world, but

also to the increased participation from the developing world in capital flows and global trade. Further, Falk (1995), Ekins (1992), Boli and Thomas (1999), contend that for the new culture of global civic societies there is an emergence of NGOs and social movements as crucial political actors looking to improve people's lives in the spheres of economic competence, environmental issues and human rights.

Disintegrative Consequences of Globalization

Preferably, globalization presents an opportunity for every kind of flow and exchange in all facets of life, in which the local is synchronized with the global and vice versa (Hannerz, 1996). Modern societies have higher exposure to foreign ideas and practices due to advancements in communication and migration that have broken down national identities (Rheingold 1995). Globalization has empowered nation states, corporations, and individuals with the ability to go around the world faster and more cheaply (Friedman 1999).

Klein (1999) contends that globalization has not spread to all cultures equally, and in fact has become a vehicle for spreading consumer culture, which is largely driven by corporations, mainly spreading Westernization or Americanization (Klein 1999). Further, Robins (1997) and Thompson (1995) warn that globalization involves processes of unequal power leading to the questioning of old practices and identities, therefore raising the possibilities of conflict.

Globalization also promotes fragmented identities and rekindles ethnic divisions that were previously dormant under the control of nation-states (Tibi, 1998; Hannerz, 1996). People have their traditional place in the world; however, due to the forces of globalization they are

looking for new identities (Tibi, 1998). Barber (1995); Huntington (1996); Kaplan (1997) and Mittleman (2000) see a bigger possibility for uncontrolled corporate powers, a higher degree of self-interest, and disregard for entire civilizations and conflicts.

According to Hughes (2002), globalization creates supra-territorialization of social interaction as it “reconfigures social space away from and beyond notions of delineated territory” (p. 424). Waters (1995) offers a similar description of globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (p. 67). In this view, globalization produces a setting where international relations are no longer completely shaped by the interaction of nations or states, but now penetrates the local forces of every nation/state (Hughes, 2002; Waters, 1995).

Further, Friedman’s (1999) analysis of globalization posits the differences between modernity and tradition using a term he coined, "Lexus," which is a symbol of affluence, luxury, western consumption and modernity, while the term, "Olive Tree", denotes a symbol of tradition, place, stable community, and roots (Friedman, 1999). He points out that the world is currently struggling between prosperity and development on the one hand and national desires to preserve tradition and identity on the other. This can be seen vividly in Zanzibar, where the impetus to preserve traditions, championed by religious leaders who follow the pillars of Islam, is undermined by the continual need for development and prosperity. Thus, globalization in Zanzibar has encouraged the Westernization of the islands.

Globalization in East Africa

How has globalization been felt in East Africa? Economic and political frustrations and disappointments have been channeled into religion and extremist movements: Heilman and Kaiser (2002) argue that the economic liberation that took place in the 1990s in Tanzania due to the forces of neo-liberalism benefited few. They point out that uncovering and analyzing these relationships reveals how crosscutting cleavages complicate the mobilization of individuals and organized groups based on identity, not only in Tanzania, but in other societies as well.

According to Haynes (2005), the Tanzanian government's announcement in 1992 that they were handing over the government-funded education and health organizations to the catholic church for control as a measure of reducing the public spending was one of the reasons behind the reemergence of political Islamic groups in the region (Haynes 2005: 1331).

Moreover, Turner (2008) examines the essence of Islamic revivalism, its development and the significance it has so far had on the people of Zanzibar. In this piece, Turner (2008) explores how information technology has helped the current global trends in Islam, and similarly played a critical part in the reconfiguration of Zanzibar's society, although he did not point out the impact it had on religious and social movement organizations. However, Mazrui (2001), focused on the probability that the numerous manifestations of Islamic neo-fundamentalism we are witnessing today are a consequence of the forces of political, economic, and cultural globalization.

Also, the current global reemergence of social movements and non-governmental organizations as dynamic actors in the political landscape provides additional signs of new principles of universal civic alliance, the culture that is currently mimicked throughout

developing countries (Falk 1995; Boli and Thomas 1999). According to Brahm (2002), the formation of a global civil society gradually has turned out to be a significant piece of globalization scholarship. It should be noted that the various social movements and NGOs are partially viewed as extensions to opposition to globalization for the mere fact that they strive to increase visibility of important issues such as equal standing on matters of economic competence, environmental protection, human rights, good governance, and poverty (Brahm 2002).

Glickman's (2011) research points to the fact that globalization has encouraged the integration of religion globally in a way that disintegrates local connections. His work also points to the unequal effects of investment and the role of NGOs in growing militant organizations. In particular, he examined the dynamics of Islamism and the rise of violent Islamist groups in Tanzania, and how these were spurred on by the recent rise of radical violent Islamic groups globally and the 1998 US Embassy bombing by al-Qaeda terrorists. Recent disenfranchisement and poverty have dissolved Zanzibar's sense of community, elevating the allure and proliferation of more fundamentalist and radical forms of Islamism coming from outside the nation. Glickman shows that globalization has encouraged the proliferation of radical Islamic literature, tapes, CD's and satellite TV as well has allowed wealthy donors from the Gulf States to fund mosques, schools, and health clinics and provide scholarships for students to travel to Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Saudis and Kuwaitis finance the two Islamic universities in Zanzibar. All providing an opportunity for larger impact of militant neo-fundamentalism in contemporary Tanzania.

I now turn more specifically to a discussion of investment, and technology growth in the East African region.

Foreign Aid and Investment (Western and Mid-East Investments)

Some scholars have examined the role of development aid and external governments on Zanzibar's development (Chachage 2001; Bakari 1993; Sheriff 1991; Wilson and Babu 1989). Zanzibar's economy depends primarily on tourism and foreign financial aid for the provision of basic services such as building schools, the maintenance of current health centers, capacity building, and the maintenance of water supply systems. Additionally, Fair (2002) examines the first ten years of the 20th century from the viewpoint of Zanzibar's urban poor, emphasizing the various and diverse means that immigrants and freed slaves struggled to better their collective and individual lives, creating a feeling of belonging in their new environment. Salih (2002) points out that Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) found in East Africa have been the bridge for spreading political Islam where faith is combined with material reward to motivate the poor and establish African Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movements.

Furthermore, Haynes (2005) and Ghandour (2002) explore Islamic sponsors and their beneficiaries who operate around working Islamic militants. They point out that it is exceptionally hard for intelligence agencies from the West to detect, localize, and prevent monetary aid supplied to finance violent radical movements. This difficulty is due to the use of NGOs as brokers, shielding their money trails. The connection between influential Islamic financiers and radical Islamic social organizations is therefore indirect. Hence, it has become

easier for organizations such as Islamic NGOs to finance and build schools or madrasas in the name of poverty reduction in the Third World (Haynes 2005).

In a different aspect, Omar (1996) and Bennet (1978) in particular have examined the historical relationship between the Omani sultanate and Zanzibar. While these studies shed light on Zanzibar's religious, political, and external relationships, they have not specifically studied social factors, specifically the ones contributing to the expansion of militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations and their organizational tactics that have impacted movement mobilization in Zanzibar.

Technology

According to Mazrui (2001) globalization, assisted by modern technology in communication and transport, has fostered an exceptional level of interaction and integration among Muslims globally, especially among the upper and middle classes; building new connections in commerce, trade, welfare programs, and scholarship. The system of relationships created here has created the transnational role of the Muslim umma, mainly with new energy from the ranks of the middle class from which to draw their leadership (Mazrui 2001).

One of the major aspects of globalization in today's world has been the use of technology, specifically the information technology and communication of the internet, which has been embraced by Muslim neo-fundamentalists around the world. The use of new information technology has had two major effects that are intertwined; one is the shrinkage of

national sovereignty and the other, shrinkage of distance, as individuals are able to communicate and interact, exchanging information in real time.

Information technology is an important mobilization mechanism for social movement actors around the world; the internet is an increasingly popular platform for political participation through social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook becoming popular among the masses (Smith 2001; Garrett 2006). Garrett (2006) contends that information technology promotes collective identity; participation of individuals creates the perception that members are part of a bigger collective group by merit of their shared grievances (Garrett 2006). Further, other scholars, such as Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), point to the fact that information technology can be a vehicle to promote collective identity in an isolated population, where mobilization of collective action can be attained by the organizers.

In contrast, Mazrui (2001) point out that modern technology has afforded Islam a brand-new possibility to accomplish the goal of becoming a universal community of believers (Mazrui 2001:13). The shrinkage of distance is rooted in Muslim consciousness as it seeks to reduce distance through faith (Mazrui 2001; Mazrui & Mazrui 2001; Robinson 1993). Abushouk (2006) points out that more than one verse in the Qur'an express that the message of Islam is universal, illustrating that Islam has presented itself as a universal and global religion, addressing the humanity of all races, from the initial period of its manifestation in Arabia.

Further, information and technological advancements have permitted citizens and nations to contribute to general understandings, events, and values in real time due to the advances in communication and information technology that have shrunk the world. In this case, not only has the world become smaller due to movements of goods and people, but a

whole visual and accessible world that never existed before has been created (i.e., social media, including easily accessible emailing and cheap telephone services). Some advocates promote globalization as a new and better way of supporting the universal objectives of economic collaboration, civil society, and good governance (Tibi 1998).

New information technologies have presented an opportunity for every kind of flow and exchange in all facets of life, in which the local is synchronized with the global and vice versa (Hannerz 1996). Further, the phenomena of globalization and its technological advancement has presented new challenges. It has contributed to fragmented identities and rekindled ethnic divisions that were previously dormant under the control of nation-states (Tibi 1998; Hannerz 1996). People have their traditional place in the world; however, due to the forces of globalization they are looking for new identities (Tibi 1998). Additionally, the processes of globalization through information technology advancement and electronic media have encouraged the proliferation of radical religious thinking and played a role in diminishing the state as a foundation of identity for many people around the world (Haynes 2014).

Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism globally

Islam is very important aspect of life in Zanzibar, as 99% of its population are Moslems. The majority of Muslim in the Islands are the moderate Sunni, followed by small group of Shiite, Ibadiyya -a small sect with origins from Oman, and small groups from Yemen -Maliki and Hanbali schools (Jumbe 1994). However, since 2001, the Saudi Wahhabism has been on the rise, due to aggressive recruitment by well-funded Saudi Arabia organizations that operates in Zanzibar and provides funds for studying abroad (Jumbe 1994; Turner 2008; Terdman 2006).

According to Liviga and Tumbo-Masabo (2006) Wahhabism form of Islam has its origins from Saudi Arabia, where it is a predominant faith. Wahhabism is regarded as an extreme or radical form of Islam that insists on a verbatim and precise interpretation of the Qur'an and whoever doesn't follow and practice this form of Islam is an enemy or infidel (LeSage 2014; Poncian 2014; Lodhi and Westerlund 1997).

Lodhi (1994) explores the historical context and status of Muslims in Zanzibar. He and Jumbe (1994) document the status of Muslims in Zanzibar at the beginning of these past two decades: Islam occupied a critical position in Zanzibar's society up until its independence from Britain, but was effectively eliminated from the public sphere by the socialist government of the early 1970s. Nonetheless, since the mid-1980s Islam has returned as an integral part of the public domain in a new and different form. The local practices of Islam are being challenged, like elsewhere in Africa, by radical reformist and renewal types of Islam that are shaped somewhat by the new trend around the globe of Islamic resurgence, although influenced by their specific local politics and histories (Lodhi 1994:92; Turner 2008:4).

Nevertheless, the present resurgence of militant Islam around the world is mostly tied to fundamentalism, which means a return to strict or literal interpretations of a religion, in this case arising in response to the forces of globalization. According to Marty and Appleby (1992), fundamentalism manifests itself as a strategy by which stressed and struggling believers try to protect their unique identity as a unit or people. Nevertheless, the contemporary trend of returning to the tenets of religion is better named neo-fundamentalism, which blends globalization, de-culturization, and the rejection of both traditional Muslim and modern Western cultures, as well as technical modernism (Roy 2004; Reifer 2006).

Bayat (2005) points out that the modernist interpretation portrays neo-fundamentalism as a reactive movement against Western style modernization carried out by the urban poor, the intellectuals, and traditional people. Additionally, he suggests that the manifestation of neo-fundamentalism is a reaction to post-modernity and its adverse effects on traditional societies. Bayat believes that these movements signify a quest for a different morality, alternative polity, and cultural autonomy against universalizing secular modernism.

Further, Huntington (1996) contends that after the Cold War, the primary source of conflict in societies is the clash between people's cultural and religious identities. Nevertheless, Steger (2009) is critical of Huntington's (1996), Barber's (1996), and Friedman's (1999) arguments, and calling them misleading. He contends that globalization was an inevitable process of universalizing Western civilization, which is battling the parochial forces of nationalism, localism, and tribalism.

Many scholars have linked the rise of Islamic social movement organizations, religious neo-fundamentalism, and terrorism, as political labels and organizing concepts that describes a phenomenon as it exists and provide moral judgment (Tilly 2004; Whittaker 2003). Jansen (1979) explores how militant Islam is not a new concept and has only caught the attention of the world because different manifestations of political Islam have emerged, more or less simultaneously, in several Muslim countries.

According to Haynes (2014) the current rise of fundamentalist Islamic social movements can be traced back to the period from 1920-1940. Haynes (1996, 1998) and Wright (1985) pointed out that during this time; many nations in the Middle East were fighting for their independence from colonial rulers. Nonetheless, the major topic of disagreement during this

period was the struggle of how far radical Islamic social movement activists can integrate the doctrines of sharia law into their countries' legal systems, considering that the majority were predominantly Muslim states (Haynes 2014).

Haynes (1993) then argued that the desire of these Muslim nations to Islamicize their societies comes from other Muslim countries in the late 19th century, which were locked in anti-pagan and anti-imperialist movements (*jihads*) that occasionally exploded, particularly in parts of East Asia and West Africa. That being said, Middle East, East Asia and West Africa were areas that the conflict between Christianity and Islam, and between modernization and tradition, was especially intense.

Sociologically, militant organizations claiming ties to Islam are a product of the modern world (Tibi 1998: 21). Since their inception in the 1900s, these militant social movement organizations have altered, concepts have changed, differences have brought diversity among these groups, and further historical circumstances have changed and split (Jansen 1979; Haynes 1996; Wright 1985). Tibi (1998) contends that the militants are mostly young products of the modern educational systems, and those who are university educated tend to be more scientific than literary. Rarely mullahs, they come from impoverished middle classes or from urbanized families (Tibi 1998).

It should be noted that Islamic neo-fundamentalists consider Islam to a great extent to be an ideology as well as a religion. These neo-fundamentalists received their education in secular universities, where they met with militant Marxists whose ideas they often take and add Qur'anic terminology (Wright 1985; Tibi 1998). The neo-fundamentalist goal is to take control of the state, which will allow for a quicker spread of Islam in societies that have been

“corrupted” by Western values and for a simultaneous use of science and technology. Neither the neo-fundamentalists nor their followers are traditionalists: they live by the values of the modern city—consumerism and upward social mobility. They left behind the old forms of pleasantness and respect for elders and for consensus when they left their villages (Tibi 1998: 26).

Islamic neo-fundamentalist movements have existed since the inception of Muslim brotherhood in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna and the creation of Jamaat-I Islami party in India by Abul-Ala Maududi. Presently they exist in different forms and structures operating all over the world. They all use the concept of jihad which, according to Wright (1985), different movements in the Middle East interpret as the sixth pillar of Islam after the established five.

During the modern times, jihad is a concept peculiar to the political imagination of Islam, which is meant to introduce a radical break that goes beyond tribal segmentation and appeals to the masses (Umma), and that transcends the values of the tribal code by calling on Islam and the sharia– “Islam versus the infidel” (Tibi 1998; Schanzer 2002; Vertigans 2009). Jihad became popular in the Islamic world due to the fact that it addresses each Muslim as an individual and not his group, his clan, or his ethnicity (Jansen 1979; Tibi 1998; Schanzer 2002; Vertigans 2011; Wright 1985).

Summary

This chapter presented the literature review for the study. I organized the chapter into four sections. The first part I reviewed social movements theory literature. The second, I divided into three sections, reviewed globalization literature in general, highlighting the general

definition of globalization, the literature on the positive/integrative consequences of globalization, and also the fragmenting/disruptive consequences of globalization. The second section discusses research on globalization and its affects in East Africa. I then discussed research on the major factors of globalization that my interviewees identified as central: funding (foreign aid/investment and NGOs) and the use of technology, as related to Tanzania and Zanzibar. Finally, I discussed the literature on the rise of Islamic neo-fundamentalism as a response to globalization.

In all, research shows that global communication and technology, finance and trade blur geographical boundaries in ways that can both integrate and fragment social groups. Research on the rise of neo fundamentalist Islamic groups links its rise to globalization generally. However, little research has been devoted to how specific aspects of globalization affect the growth and development of particular groups in Zanzibar. In what specific ways does globalization affect the resources and collective identity of the UAMSHO organization in Zanzibar?

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODS

In order to understand how specific aspects of globalization affect the resources and collective identity of militant neo-fundamentalist groups, I employed primarily qualitative research methods. In this chapter I will describe in details my research methods, entry to the field, interviews, sampling, document analysis, ethnographic observations, data analysis and coding, triangulation, ethnical implications, validity issues, Reflexivity and Textual Politics.

I began my research as an investigation of Zanzibar's unique construction of racial identity among interracial African and Arab populations, and the role of that multi-ethnic identity and religion in politics. As I will describe, I gained access to a youth political organization in Zanzibar. However, as the political situation developed in Zanzibar in the years after my initial interviews, I began to realize that the activists that I interviewed were at the forefront of another group that came to represent the growth of organized militant neo-fundamentalist organization expressing grievances in terms of religion. Hence, in those interviews I gained rare insight into how individuals, who would later use religion to justify violence, articulated their relation to globalization.

Qualitative Research

The aim of qualitative research, as Morrow and Smith (2000) put it, is to enlighten and understand participant implication. Further, Strauss and Corbin (1990) stress that qualitative methods can be used to better understand any phenomenon about which very little is yet

known. Additionally, qualitative research can be a vehicle to gaining new perspectives on phenomena that are already known, or can help to gain more in-depth information that may be difficult to convey by using quantitative methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

It should be noted that qualitative data have the capability to completely tell a story or experience from the viewpoint of the researcher as well as the reader (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Qualitative research refers to an investigative method of understanding grounded in distinctive methodological principles of study that explore human or social problems (Creswell 1998). Therefore, using qualitative methodology allowed me to study the phenomenon of globalization and the rise of Islamic neo-fundamentalism in Zanzibar in its naturalistic setting.

Entry to the Field

Gaining access to any field is not easy, especially when the researcher is not a member and the field is a 'closed' one like Zanzibar. However, in my case I was a native Tanzanian who speaks Kiswahili (the native language). I had prior experience researching in Zanzibar in the 1990s while working as a radio producer covering current affairs. Also, I happened to know an influential researcher who connected me to the CUF vigilante youth group -the Blue Guard (top ranked officials) who afforded me unprecedented access to the field. At the time, the Blue Guard was well known as CUF security and advisory group, although later, through the inner circles I came to find out that these are the same individuals who make up the UAMSHO group. When I arrived in Zanzibar and made contact with my key informants, and set up initial meetings with individuals who I was to interview with a verbal promise of keeping all in confidential. I was very surprised by the Blue Guard age make-up due to the fact that some of

the members I wouldn't categorize as youth. As to my knowledge I perceived youth to be between the ages of 18-35 years; but the Blue Guard had older members some between 35-50 years old. At this point, I started paying more attention to the organization of this group and how they conducted their activities then realized within the Blue Guard group there is another secretive organization operating covertly. Later, I realized that the secretive organization within the Blue Guards are the same individuals that make up the UAMSHO group.

My travels to Zanzibar were funded by a \$5000 UNLV SITE Grant received in March of 2003. On July 22, 2004, I travelled by speed boat from Dar es Salaam to Zanzibar. As soon as I arrived in Zanzibar port I was received by 3 officials who helped me reserve a hotel room close to the CUF headquarters in Stone Town. Further, they gave me a tour of Stone Town and CUF offices and areas in which they meet daily for unofficial meetings or just to relax and enjoy a cup of coffee in the evening. I did not expect to be received in this manner, however, the officials explained to me that they have a high regard for researcher friend, hence they felt comfortable allowing me access to the movement and its members.

However, to stay in the field as a known observer, a listener who had minimal participation in meetings and minimal participation in rallies as part of organizing committees, I had to provide some things which would legitimize my presence in the field. Therefore, regularly, I helped in buying coffee or a couple of bottled water cartons for some of the members who are unemployed or have little money. Mostly I helped by translating English news from local and international television and radio stations for the members, most of whom had minimal or no understanding of the English language. In this way, my presence in the field was welcomed, because the participants felt like I was a part of their daily struggles and

mission, specifically in making their goal of understanding and receiving international news attainable. However, I did not take any notes in their presence; instead I used my tiny recorder whenever needed and later in my hotel room transcribed notes from it.

I spent a total of 2 months and 2 weeks in the field. I lived in a nearby hotel in the middle of Stone Town, which afforded me an easy access to the field. I remained in touch with several of the individuals over the next 8 years via email. I returned to Zanzibar 2 times on June 2006 and August 2009 where I informally conducted ethnographic observations at different outdoor rallies and UAMSHO lectures plus hung out with some of my informants.

Interviews

I conducted open-ended in-depth interviews with 40 UAMSHO activist informants in Zanzibar in the summer of 2003. Various qualitative researchers distinguish between participant observation and in-depth (ethnographic) interviewing. However, Lofland (1971) points out that the two go together and much of the data collected in participant observation is a result of informal interviewing in the field. Interviews were unstructured in order to allow for greater range than structured interviews.

The difference between structured and unstructured interviewing is that with the latter the interviewer can respond to questions asked by respondents and also let his/her personal feelings influence him/her and veer from the image, which is supposed to be the “ideal” of a distant, cool, and rational interviewer. Unstructured interviewing centers the creation of a human to human relationship with the subject(s) and the inclination to understand phenomena relative to explanation. Additionally, with unstructured interviewing, the interviewer learns

from natives, i.e., their culture, language, and ways of life (Altheide 1976; Fontana 1977; Fontana and Frey 1994 and Lofland 1971).

My interviews lasted approximately half an hour to one hour and focused on members' own definitions and explanations of the meaning and/or strategies of the movement of UAMSHO. Interviews of movement officials and bureaucrats focused on background information and perceptions of the members/activists. Where necessary, the interviews were audio taped in respondents' native language (Kiswahili), then transcribed and later translated into English for analysis. In this case, the researcher is a native of Tanzania and speaks Kiswahili. It was easy to blend in and get the necessary information and connections needed to complete the research. In addition to the in-depth interviews, participants provided demographic information including age, race or ethnicity, formal education level, formal and informal organization memberships, socioeconomic status, and family size. These demographic questions guided in-depth interview questions.

Participants/Sampling

I selected UAMSHO activists through a purposive sampling where the activists were recruited through personal referrals by the movement's members, movement officials, and CUF leadership. All the activists I interviewed were members of the movement, selected by movement officials or referred to be by either officials or influential movement activists. As well, at one point, I conducted a snowball sampling in order to enroll an equal number of women and men as participants.

The individuals interviewed were between the ages of 18-50 years old, married, and unmarried. Further, all 40 activists interviewed reported that they subscribe to Islam as their religion, are involved in politics, and identify themselves as of either Zanzibari or identified themselves as Arab(s), with few being specific that they are of Yemen ancestry but majority decline to disclose their ancestry. Fifty percent of the activists identified themselves as unemployed or underemployed. Additionally, 75% of the activists interviewed confirmed they had a cellular phone, knowledge/use of the internet and participate in one or more social media networking sites such as Myspace, Facebook, Darhotwire, online forums, YouTube, and blogging platforms.

Ethnographic Observations

I conducted ethnographic observations in Zanzibar in the same time period: as Whyte (1943); Anderson (1999); Duneier (1999) point out, ethnographic observation helps frame the setting adequately. My field was divided into three areas: the UAMSHO offices located in the middle of Stone Town at a place called Forodhani, where they gave me an office space specifically for my in-depth interviews during the day. The second site was Jaws Corner at Mkunazini, which is an empty space with benches for members to sit, and a centerfold, a table with some chairs, plus three huge coffee kettles in a charcoal grill, surrounded by shops and arcades. UAMSHO members and non-members who are interested gather here every day after evening prayers for coffee and informal discussion until 12 or 1 am. Finally, the third site was Lebanon Corner at Sokomuhogo, it had the same characteristics and setting as Jaws Corner, but the setting is more 'quiet' and 'classy.' Only high-ranked officials gather here, coming twice a

week for coffee and donuts after evening prayers. They keep each other up to date on the movement by comparing notes. Notably, no female members can be seen in these open-air meetings.

My day was divided into two segments; from 9 am to 5 pm I generally spent at the offices for interviews. Sometimes I joined a couple of UAMSHO members for a walk around the town to observe their recruiting efforts and/or check out what was going on with other members and also non-members. From 6:30 pm to 12 or 1 am I usually participated and observed informal meetings at Jaws or Lebanon Corner, then went back to my hotel for brief note writing before going to bed.

Additionally, documenting all of my observations in the field was very important to the research since memory can be faulty. I utilized the 'jotted notes' method, writing down all the important things in my journal/note book. Although the availability of digital voice recorders and video cameras are making the process of data collection more efficient, at the time of my research I did not have a video camera. As advised by Lofland (1971) and Fontana and Prokos (2007), I took notes of everything, especially at the beginning of my research, and focused my observations as the problem become more defined. Further, as noted in Lofland and Lofland (1995), I took notes regularly and did not neglect note taking while participating in the interactions in the field. If it was not possible to make notes immediately I made a point to write things down at the earliest moment possible, while field memory was still fresh (Lofland and Lofland 1995).

Document Analysis

I also employed archival and secondary research materials obtained in the US and Tanzania. I examined and analyzed various official documents, economic and financial reports, charters, policy statements, and speeches by leaders of the UAMSHO group, including reports on Zanzibar's social, economic, and political conditions. Further, I looked closely at the historical documents of government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) written regarding Zanzibar's political, social, and cultural environment that have fostered and encouraged the radicalization of some individuals. Additionally, I looked at daily newspaper coverage regarding the UAMSHO group, and I perused weekly magazines that covered news of the group, as Babbie (1998) recommends.

I examined patterns in the selected documents that would explain social conditions leading to the rise of neo-fundamentalist movement as well as factors which could facilitate member recruitment and impact organizational strategies. It should be noted that there is no standard approach to analyzing these sorts of documents. However, Weber (1947) emphasized the role of *verstehen* as a way to conduct scientific investigation differently from the traditional way. *Verstehen* focuses more on the ability to understand and feel the others' experiences. I used this method of interpretive understanding to generate information by putting myself in the social context in order to understand UAMSHO members' views, situations, circumstances and feelings, and to interpret their actions appropriately.

Data Analysis Strategy and Coding

I began the analysis soon after the completion of interviews in the field by transcribing the audio to text. The transcribed text was in the activists' native Kiswahili. I then translated the interviews from Kiswahili to English. Since Kiswahili is my native language, I was able to translate the interviews without changing the meaning of what the activists told me.

I started by reading and rereading the transcribed data and reducing the data to manageable files after I removed redundant data. Then I analyzed each interview for word order and identified phrases and keywords that were shared amongst interviewees. The phrases and keywords the activists used then appeared as word clouds that I examined and color coded with appropriate grouping labels (Saldana 2009:4). Throughout each coding method, commonalities developed. I noted in memo form first the themes and then the patterns appearing in my notebook for future reference.

When I completed coding categories, I compared them to one another, followed by a second round of pattern coding that helped with recognizing corresponding data. I then summarized them into combined categories or subcategories (Saldana 2009:48). I repeated this process twice to ensure that I examined all my data, although I might have used some of the codes repetitively. Then, I conducted a third level of coding to examine outcomes from the first two steps and see how the subcategories and the new categories interrelated with each other (Saldana 2009). Lastly, I went through the research findings and written memos, as they relate to the implications of the study.

Primary Level Coding

I started by completing primary level coding for naming, from concepts to categories, and then to themes. The initial coding phase employed structural coding, in which the raw data (brief notes taken during the interview) was processed and labeled. From the structural coding of raw data, I developed the memo code, in which the following labels were created: *politics, religion/faith, globalization, violence, employment, economy, union government, secession, corruption, poverty, social decay, land issues, personal experiences, grievances, race, family, gender roles, identity, basic education, religious education, tradition culture, human rights, oppression, foreign investment(s), aid, technology, internet, YouTube, ideology, democracy, convert, movement tactics, marginalization, connection, Christian dominance, constitutional reform, political alienation and tourism.*

According to Saldana (2009), the process of structural coding is intended as a springboard in organizing data around specific research questions. The memo-codes resulting from my preliminary coding are the several aspects that show strong relationships to the development of UAMSHO as a radical Islamic social movement in Zanzibar.

Secondary Level Coding

I performed secondary level coding to analyze the relationships among the themes that developed during my primary level coding (Saldana 2009). In this stage of coding, pattern coding resulted in meta-codes; I recoded the data from the first-level coding by grouping the labels into three themes, including the thirty-eight initial labels that developed from the raw data.

Meta-codes were utilized to identify the aspects of UAMSHO activists' transformation into a radical neo-fundamentalist group. I found three key meta codes. The first meta-code theme or category I named **Foreign Aid and Investment** (economic aid and investment from Western Neo-Liberal economies and Middle Eastern NGOs). The labels contained therein all speak to the deeply-rooted belief of UAMSHO activists that neo-liberalism, as an extension of globalization, has played a major role in facilitating the connection to the larger world in terms of culture and economy and also that it was previously missing from the Muslim world. The following aspects from the initial first level coding labels—foreign investment, aid, tourism, economy, employment, NGOs, human rights, social decay, poverty, religious education, globalization, faith, personal experiences, grievances, traditional culture, and gender roles—are all elements that revealed their views on proliferation of neo-liberalism and globalization in Zanzibar.

I found these aspects to be major contributors to UAMSHO activists' many grievances and feelings regarding Zanzibar's dependent economy. UAMSHO activists' discontent stems from high unemployment rates, which is at 35% for youth; widespread poverty (\$48 in earnings per month); and lack of access to clean water, electricity, and health services (Zanzibar Statistical Outlook, RGZ, 2010). UAMSHO activists that I interviewed spoke of the struggles of obtaining employment and of the low quality of life in the country after almost 54 years of independence, leaving the majority of unemployed youths (80% of the youths under 30 years of age) with nothing to look forward to, except participating in the movement. UAMSHO activists also spoke to the fact that the organization has received funding and support from regional

NGOs -- Saudi Arabian relief agencies, Kuwait, and the Aga Khan foundation to help fund and support madrasas, Islamic centers, health clinics, and mosques in Zanzibar.

New technology is the second meta-code I identified and was expressed by the first level coding labels –internet, YouTube, movement tactics, connection(s), mass media, and globalization. UAMSHO is actively using modern communication technology to reach out and recruit new members. It is also actively using YouTube as a means of spreading their messages throughout the world. There are more than 30 YouTube videos of speeches by UAMSHO officials from different rallies around Zanzibar on the UAMSHO YouTube channel. Further, UAMSHO is active on the internet; they have a blog and webpage where they have posted their constitution and other documents communicating with their members.

UAMSHO also provide access to Qur'an texts translated into Kiswahili, along with other Islamic literature, DVDs, cassettes, and CDs. This category also speaks to the UAMSHO use of other mass media to their benefit as they have radio and TV programs, newspaper articles and the use of apps as a means of informing its members. UAMSHO activists spoke of the use of modern technology as a means to preserve their traditions, but at the same time to reach new members quickly, easily, and cheaply.

The third meta category is **Islamic Neo-Fundamentalist Identity** and covers the development of a group identity based on nationalism and religion. This category was expressed in first-level coding labels named union government, ideology, secession, politics, political alienation, democracy, corruption, marginalization, Christian dominance, land issues, gender roles, family, tradition culture, religious education, social decay and oppression. This category is dominated by factors that fostered grievances among UAMSHO activists, beginning

with the political landscape of issues with the Union. It also addressed how they identified themselves against political enemies, how they described who was in or out of their group.

The first-level coding labels in this category define UAMSHO grievances, where they claim that Zanzibar has been marginalized, and enslaved for the past 50 years by the CCM government, and used religious language to differentiate themselves from CCM. Also, other first-level coding labels speak to the fact that UAMSHO aims to return Zanzibar to its authentic religious roots. The labels in this category all speak to the feelings of UAMSHO activists that it is the predominantly Christian union government and people from mainland Tanzania who exploit Zanzibar in every way, shape, and form, and that Zanzibaris are not benefiting, rather they are left in the midst of poverty and underdevelopment. UAMSHO goal is to rid of Christian dominance as they refer to it in Kiswahili as *mfumo kristo*.

Table 1: Meta-codes: The three aspects of UAMSHO's transformation

Foreign Aid and Investment (Western & Mid-East Investments)	New Technology and Identity	Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism
Foreign Investment	Basic Education	Land Issues
Aid	Technology	Gender Roles
Tourism	Internet	Family
Economy	YouTube	Christian Dominance
Employment	Mass Media	Traditional Culture
NGOs	Connection	Union Government
Gender roles	Globalization	Secession
Human Rights	Traditional Culture	Politics
Social Decay	Religious Education	Democracy
Poverty	Social decay	Oppression
Religious Education	Gender roles	Political Alienation
Tradition Culture		Marginalization
Faith		Ideology
Violence		Constitutional Reform
Personal experiences		Race
Globalization		Identity
Grievances		Converts
Race		Religion

Triangulation confirmed the significance of the data and themes identified. These themes reflect the voices of activists in the field as they were expressing their experiences and participation in UAMSHO's activities.

Triangulation

I supported data analysis through the process of triangulation. I coded and recoded the initial data after transcription and translation from Swahili to English and then looked at how new labels might influence the data analysis. It should be noted that if additional labels were to arise from the first-level coding and did not fit in with the present thirty-eight labels, I would have left them as independent labels and waited for the second-level coding, where the labels might fit in within the three meta-codes I developed. Additionally, some of the labels overlap within meta-codes, for example foreign aid and investment (neo-liberalism and NGOs) includes labels such as globalization and traditional culture, where activists spoke of them in the new technology and identity category.

Therefore, these categories—**foreign aid and investment** (neoliberalism and NGOs), **new technology**, and **Islamic neo-fundamentalist identity** in Zanzibar—are some of the forces that have contributed to the proliferation of militant neo-fundamentalist organizations as a response to globalization in Zanzibar. Further, Zanzibar's social conditions of widespread poverty, corruption, political alienation, and marginalization, where Muslims claim to be alienated from employment and business opportunities, are linked to the forces mentioned above as factors that have contributed to the rise of radical Islamic social movements in Zanzibar. Nevertheless, the Muslim world's lack of power relative to the West has created

disenchanted youths, large numbers of unemployed persons, and a shrinking middle class, while at the same time producing an informal economy that broadens economic inequality in the society.

Ethical Implications

There are possible ethical problems that might emerge during field work, which include but are not limited to the protection of research subjects. Therefore, receiving Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval is of essential importance, and for this research I received an approval from the UNLV IRB office before the start of my fieldwork in Zanzibar in 2004.

Zanzibar has been a volatile place politically since the return of multiparty politics. People of Arabic descent do not feel comfortable with the ruling government; hence they tend to be hostile towards the government and sometimes participate in rioting and terrorism.

As a result, confidentiality and privacy was a key issue. I conducted my fieldwork around these people and I got to know them and their struggles well, but did not report them to either Zanzibari, Tanzanian or the US governments, as they may have interest in this information. I provided my informants with verbal and written consent forms that agreed on confidentiality and privacy of the information they provided. Further, I want to be clear that at any point during my interactions and interviewing activists, I did not ask or provided any information regarding any specific acts of violence. My question(s) probed on the issue of violence in general. All the information regarding violent acts that found in this dissertation are from newspaper sources, as I do not have a first-hand information or witnessed any violent acts while completing this research project. However, the main ethical problem I had

to encounter was knowing someone who would be considered a terrorist or verbally promising to act in a terroristic manner and not reporting this to authorities.

Further, to ensure confidentiality of my informants' I have masked their identities in my field notes and provided pseudonym throughout their quotes that I used in this research. Additionally, it was important to disguise the identities of the activists I interviewed, due to the fact that UAMSHO morphed from the Blue Guard, a link that has been denied by UAMSHO, because by itself is a very dangerous information.

However, my informants will have a chance to raise their voices through my text and to reach a specific audience. This is intended to be a way of empowering them with an authoritative voice through me, which might allow them to be taken more seriously in their struggles. The voices of my informants will be presented in a variety of ways, including important quotes and analysis of the current Zanzibarian situation and how their different struggles might best serve the other people in Zanzibar.

The most important aspect is to understand the current Zanzibar situation and its peoples' struggle against the government, particularly their wish to secede from the union arrangement with mainland Tanzania. The phenomenon, as interesting as it may sound, is not about revolution, or grand truth, but about understanding the struggles of disaffected youth, specifically the UAMSHO group, in their society and the world at large.

Altheide and Johnson (1994) warn that in conducting ethnographic research and analysis certain problems are inevitable and unavoidable, inevitably influencing observations, findings, and analyses. Any particular observer must achieve some pragmatic resolution of these dilemmas so research observations and field experiences are thereby influenced in some unknown manner by whatever practical resolution is achieved (Altheide and Johnson

1994). Given that the society I seek to study and understand today is so complex, pluralistic, and ever-changing, it was necessary to go back and learn from other observers as to how they solved these inevitable field problems (Altheide and Johnson 1994:491).

Validity Issues

To address the issue of validity in this project I have attempted to be as descriptive as possible throughout this report. I have described how I conducted the ethnography, and particularly how I dealt with particular problems encountered during the course of the project. However, as a critical researcher I understand that assertions of truth are mostly broadly described and conveyed in association to power (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994:153). This is to suggest that due to the fact that truth is never fully known, then truth can be compared to an influence in power.

According to Kincheloe and McLaren (1994), truth contains a certain level of adjustment and control, which has to be met for certain accounts to be relevant. If not, truth turns out to be irrelevant. Therefore, according to Carspecken (1993), without exception, when we behave in each step of our behavior we imply and assume it is the standard of correct behavior and can be applied universally to its relation to truth (Carspecken 1993).

However, Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) also contend that “truth is internally related to meaning in a pragmatic way through normative referenced claims, intersubjective referenced claims, subjective referenced claims, and the way we deictically ground or anchor meaning in our daily lives” (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994).

So, when the report is finalized, I intend to take my findings to my informants and see if they think that what I found is true or if I misinterpreted their accounts. If so, rewriting must occur. Lofland and Lofland (1995) describe this process as dialogical validity, where the researcher gives the text to the people he or she studied and asks if they see themselves in the text. I have paid attention to important ethnographic features such as dates, times, and locations, as well as the language used by the people I study, especially the jargon they use. Hence, this is the best way I can assess the validity of my findings.

However, Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) assert that validity is of more value to a critical researcher than simply a traditional definition of external and internal validity due to the fact that it is connected to the context presented. Therefore, for a critical researcher like me, a suitable term to use in this project is '**trustworthiness**,' as it is deeper and fits the context (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994:151). I can connect the trustworthiness notion with what Ellis and Bochner's (2000) claim that validity means that our work seeks credibility; it elicits in our readers an emotional state or reaction that gives a realistic account of experiences that is likely and credible. Also, validity may be looked at to whether it benefits how readers interact with other individuals who are different and or propose a means to enhance the lives or condition of my readers and participants (Ellis and Bochner 2000:751).

The goals of my research was not to search for any grand laws governing radical social movements, such as the UAMSHO group in Zanzibar, but to present facts and if possible to help criticize these sorts of groups, which undermine the spirit, values, and norms of Zanzibarian society and Tanzania at large. I must also avoid Eurocentrism in my role as a mouthpiece for the voices of my informants in Zanzibar (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994:152).

Furthermore, the main strategy I have used in addressing the issue of validity is writing a report that will not impose any kind of grand truth on my readers, but try to convey a sense of trustworthiness. Also, the use of quotes and my informants' voices will help verify that what is written in the text are fair representation of the group or activists I researched.

Similarly, according to Lofland and Lofland (1995), a project can have an arousing interest and measure validity according to the following three criteria; trueness, newness, and importance. Trueness as a dimension of arousing interest is primarily a threshold test. A report is not of any special interest simply because it is true, but it needs to be true in order to be of interest for other reasons. Even though limited in this way, trueness is obviously of key importance (Lofland and Lofland 1995:150). Hence, Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that following a disciplined procedure of data collection is the best insurance of empirical accuracy and trueness. The dimension of newness as an element of arousing audience interest is founded on the reasonable desire not to waste resources assembling facts that are already well established or repeating ideas that are already developed and widely known (Lofland and Lofland 1995:151-152).

Therefore, a thorough literature review will discover the extent to which radical Islamic social movements in Zanzibar as a subject has been pursued or studied by other scholars inside and outside of Tanzania. Since current societies are continually churning up new social formations and practices, especially among religious extremist groups, research like mine, which looks at the rise of radical Islamic social movements in Zanzibar, can be categorized as a first report (Lofland and Lofland 1995:152).

Reflexivity and Textual Politics

Throughout this process different kinds of emotions surfaced. I have attempted to articulate them throughout this project, noting that self-reflection is important in qualitative research. I'm more concerned with human rights protection than political boundaries; hence I can give back to my community that way. Further I can help my people to have a deeper understanding of the aspects that have contributed to the rise of militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations such as the UAMSHO group. Wanting to understand the factors and mechanisms of the rise of militant social movement organizations in ever expanding neo-fundamentalist networks around the world, needless to say, inspired me to choose the research questions I want to answer.

Adopting the role of critical ethnographer, brings with it the additional research responsibilities of raising a voice on behalf of activists to a larger audience is equally empowering and brings authority to my subjects' voices (Thomas 1993). I have been intrigued with the rise of militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations in Zanzibar for quite some time, and I wanted to understand their contribution and connection with the broader global radical Islamic social movement organizations. I think I am coming from a place where I take pride in the values of Tanzanian society, which respects other societies' cultures, norms and values; however, I am not proud of the negative connotations that come with the intolerant activities of some groups in Tanzania and specifically Zanzibar with radical ideology on their minds.

In the present research, I explore the factors contributing to the rise of militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations, particularly the UAMSHO group in Zanzibar. I

took a front seat as participant observer and had access to a largely closed culture in Zanzibar where access is difficult for outsiders. My primary bias throughout the project had to do with my own negative image of associating with a militant Islamic social movement organization such as the UAMSHO group.

My background as a practicing Catholic may come with a certain level of bias towards Muslims. I took extra steps to remain mindful of this when interacting with my informants in the field and interpreting their beliefs and practices. Although I had good connections to the field and access to the gatekeeper, it is my belief if I was a Muslim, I could have much easier access to the field. Because of Tanzania's colonial history, those who converted to Christianity had better education, greater access to social services, and higher social status than Muslims and those who were non-religious.

I was able to establish a genuine friendly relationship with my informants, where I listened to them carefully and tried to lend them a sympathetic ear in different situations when they came to me. In this way, I became more attuned to their problems and could better see their movement's struggles from their perspective in terms of the experiences they encountered in their daily activities (Thomas 1993).

Nevertheless, there are possible effects of establishing strong relationships with informants in the field, including turning 'native' and hence obscuring my findings. Throughout this experience, some of my informants with whom I developed close relationships, made me feel as if I had a dual role: that of a researcher and therapist as Ellis and Bochner (1994) describe, where I tried to offer myself in the role of confidant. However,

my intention was to stay in the level of a 'friend' so as to gain important information from them.

I did all this with the purpose of producing a story about the rise of militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organization in Zanzibar; with the intention of understanding UAMSHO members and what factors have contributed to the rise of neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations.

Summary

In this chapter I outlined my research involving qualitative inquiry and secondary quantitative data analysis in exploring issues surrounding the development of militant fundamentalist social movements and the rise of violent activities that have been associated with religious extremism in Zanzibar, specifically activities associated with the UAMSHO (Awakening), said to adhere to strict neo-fundamentalist views of Islam and calls for Zanzibar to secede from the mainland, Tanzania. Further, I explained the coding process and the emergence of different themes/categories in detail. Lastly, I documented the triangulation process that I used to verify the results.

CHAPTER 4

ZANZIBAR'S POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL LANDSCAPE

In this chapter I will discuss the social and political context leading to the development of UAMSHO. In particular, I look at globalization and its impact on the racial, ethnic and religious diversity of the island, its political and economic development, the party conflicts that framed the CUF and its vigilante group the Blue Guard initial formation, and the development of UAMSHO as an organization.

Zanzibar's early global connections – Middle Eastern and European colonization

The history of Zanzibar is much influenced by its physical location. It is located on the major trade routes of the Indian Ocean, making it accessible to all, including traders from Eastern Asia, explorers, and colonialists from Europe.

The first people to settle in Zanzibar are believed to be Bantu-speaking people who emigrated from mainland Africa approximately 2000 years ago. In the early 700s BC contacts between Arab and many parts of the Eastern African coastline developed, including trade between Zanzibar and the Arabian Peninsula. The Kiswahili language and culture were formed around the first millennium AD. The first Arab traders settled in 800 AD; the traders and Bantu-speaking people began to intermingle and permanent settlements were created.

As early as the 1st century A.D., there were trade links between the East African coast and the people of the Middle and Far East. Zanzibar and Mombasa were the main coastal city-states that had established these links. By the 10th century, Persians had started arriving in Zanzibar. One notable arrival was Hassan bin Ali Sultan who docked on the Zanzibar coast with his six sons. Hassan bin Ali Sultan formed what was then called the Zanj Empire, where he made Zanzibar and Kilwa the centers of his control. Zanzibar went on to become the center of political rule in East Africa.

Zanzibar developed into an influential trading city-state around the 12th and 15th centuries when trade with the Persian Gulf and Arabia peaked. Zanzibar was powerful due to its slave trade, gold, ivory, and wood.

The Portuguese invaded and took control of the East African coast around the beginning at the end of the 15th century. Vasco da Gama arrived in Zanzibar in March of 1499, on his way back to Portugal from Southern Africa (Knappert 1992). According to Knappert (1992), in 1593 Mombasa became the East African headquarters of the Hispano-Portuguese Empire in the Indian Ocean. Mombasa, with its many churches, became the capital of the Portuguese colonial state, while the Portuguese introduced Christianity to the region, but Zanzibar had only one church, with one priest, therefore Christianity nevertheless flourished there (Gray 1962).

In 1652, an Omani fleet arrived in Zanzibar, conquered the island, and expelled the Portuguese, killing the priest and anyone who did not convert to Islam. This was the beginning of the Arab conquest of the East African City States, which came under Omani's Empire (Gray 1962).

In 1699, the Omani Arabs took control of most of the coast and in 1832 Zanzibar became the seat of the Omani sultanate. These Omani invested heavily in spice plantations and cloves, especially in Pemba and Zanzibar, which also became their slave trade headquarters. The traders introduced Islam to the indigenous people and the religion grew inland, spreading its practices and traditional beliefs. Islam and the Swahili culture grew in Zanzibar and along the shores of Eastern Africa.

Hence, the 18th century found Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba) as a part of the Muscat and Oman Empire (Gray 1962; Knappert 1992; Sheriff 2001). Sultan Seyyid Said cemented Omani rule in Zanzibar when he transferred his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1832. Sultan Seyyid is known for building remarkable palaces with striking gardens and for enriching the islands' economy by bringing cash crops such as sugar, palm oil, coconut, cloves. He also conducted an active slave trade with the mainland.

The 18th century Omani rule saw the rapid growth of the slave trade, resulting from high demand for plantation slaves around the world, with especially high demand in the Americas. Zanzibar became the largest slave trading center around the mid-19th century, where it's estimated approximately 600,000 individuals were sold between 1830 and 1873.

19th Century European Colonization

By the early 1860s the Omani rule itself began to weaken. Zanzibar became a sultanate independent from Oman in 1861. Although Sultan Seyyid had full control of Zanzibar and portions of the mainland, his control of the area was purely commercial rather than territorial

(Lofchie 1965). The sultanate did not have any legal claims to the lands, therefore, it could not keep the Germans and British from annexing these lands during the European nations' division of Africa in the late 18th century (Lofchie 1965; Knappert 1992). From 1870 - 1888, at the time of Sultan Barghash's rule, Britain and Germany took economic control of the East African territories and divided the lands between themselves. The British proclaimed Zanzibar a protectorate in 1890 and declared the end of the slave trade.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the supremacy of Germany and the elimination of the East African slave trade destabilized the Sultan's empire and eventually he lost more territory to the European countries (Lofchie 1965). Henceforth, the Sultan Seyyid entered into an agreement with the British and Germans to sell his possessions on the mainland, while he retained control of only the coastal strip (Knappert 1992). According to Knappert (1992), the Germans, who were first in colonizing mainland Tanzania (known then as Tanganyika), entered into an agreement with the British to exchange Zanzibar for Heligoland. Although technically the Sultan was still the ruler, Zanzibar effectively became a British colony (Sheriff 2001).

In 1890, the British government took over political and administrative matters in Zanzibar, and turned the islands into a British Protectorate, which left the third Sultan of Zanzibar, Khalifa bin Said as only a symbolic head of state (Knappert 1992; Sheriff 2001). In 1914 the Protectorate Council was formed and the ninth Sultan of Zanzibar, Khalifa bin Harub was made the council's President while the British consul became the Vice President (Knappert 1992). This system was a common factor of most colonial control involving indirect rule. 1926 saw the formation of the Legislative and Executive Council, without representation of Arabs or

Africans on the council, further illustrating that control and power was in the hands of the British (Fair 2002).

Race and class and the formation of Zanzibar's political parties

British colonialists encouraged the creation of associations along racial lines that later became the basis for political parties. Economic development in nineteenth century Zanzibar was based on two sectors: trade and a plantation economy (Sheriff 2001). The commercial trade sector was very important as Zanzibar was the center of commerce for eastern Africa. This gave rise to a prosperous merchant class, and the beginnings of an urban working class. On the other hand, the plantation economy created a slave society with rich feudalists, many of whom were Omanis, who imported slaves from the mainland.

These two sectors produced a racial paradigm that tended to label the population according to their economic roles (Sheriff 2001; Flint 1965). The owners of the clove and coconut plantations, who occupied most government administrative positions, were elite Arabs (Flint 1965). Indians and other Asians constituted the commercial class in Zanzibar and hence were considered the middle class. They dominated the retail and wholesale trade, import and export business, and the middle tiers of government. This left Africans in the underprivileged position in Zanzibar, where they were unskilled manual and agricultural laborers (Lofchie 1965; Sheriff 2001).

According to Lofchie (1965) each of the racial groups possessed a separate social and economic subculture, and most social relations were carried on within ethnic boundaries. The

only exception was inter-ethnic contact in the marketplace, and even there racial and ethnic relations were conducted in the form of economic superior versus economic inferior, such as employer versus employee, master versus servant, and landowner versus laborer etc., which made race an important basis of loyalty and group solidarity (Lofchie 1965).

British colonial policy further categorized based on race. To ration food during World War II the government imposed a race based formula allocating food first to Europeans, then to Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, Goans and Arabs) and then to Africans. In the 1948 census, the British government categorized Zanzibaris into Arabs, Shirazis (a sub-group of Swahili people claiming descendants from merchant princes from Shiraz of Persian settled along the coast of East Africa), Indians, and other African tribes (Martin 1978). Thus, individuals who may have labelled themselves Swahili or simply African increasingly claimed their Persian descent through the Shirazi label. The African, Shirazi, Indian, and Arab associations that were formed in the 1950s have embroiled Zanzibar in continuous political turmoil ever since (Sheriff 2001).

A pan African movement for independence grew in the 1950s and Shirazi, Arabs and Africans on Zanzibar joined in. Several political parties emerged in Zanzibar, all fighting for independence from the British, and drawing on ethnic and racial identities in different ways. These included: The Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP), the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), and the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) (Lofchie 1965; Martin 1978; Sheriff 2001). The ZNP followed Arab bloodlines, drew the more recent Arab immigrants and were supported by Arab Associations. Arab parties sought an end to colonial rule, but supported the retention of the Arab Sultanate monarchy. The ASP was created as a result of the union of the African Association and the Shirazi Association. This African party mobilized members in an appeal to

African independence and nationalism. The ZPPP emerged later after a disagreement within the ASP, with some Shirazi members leaving to form the ZPPP (Sheriff 2001).

At this time the political landscape of Zanzibar was dominated by constant conflicts within parties and against other parties that caused many politicians to shift back and forth from one party to another. Arabs accused Africans of wanting to sell Zanzibar to Tanganyika. Africans accused Arabs of supporting a return to slavery. Both cultural groups needed the Shirazi. In 1960 53% of 300,000 Zanzibaris reported themselves as Shirazi, 20% were African immigrants, and were 17% Arab. Indeed, the African party called themselves the Afro-Shirazi Party to draw support from Arabs close to them on the socioeconomic ladder. The two remained united through ousting colonial rule. But the Shirazi were reluctant allies with Africans, and the Shirazi on Pemba withdrew their support and later joined with the Arab Zanzibar National Party. The Zanzibar National Party drew support from Muslim Africans and Shirazi as well based on an appeal to the brotherhood of all (Lofchie 1965; Martin 1978; Jumbe 1994; Sheriff 2001; Fair 2002, Mbwiliza 2000). Tensions grew between the groups.

In the 1960s while most African countries gained their independence, the British government granted Zanzibar limited self-rule (Lofchie 1965; Sheriff 2001). The self-rule that was passed to then Sultan and the Arabs came with contested elections in June 1957 and January 1961 that had no winner to form a government due to political factionalism (Sheriff 2001). This electoral stalemate led to a deciding ballot initiative in June 1961, where 23 seats were up for grabs among the three contending major parties (Lofchie 1965; Sheriff 2001). Two of these parties, the Arab dominated ZNP and the Shirazi dominated ZPPP, formed an alliance

after the June elections and won thirteen seats, defeating the ASP, which had won only ten seats.

Post-colonial politics: Independence and single party rule 1963-1994

Zanzibar's independence did not help the growing political and social fractures along class, ethnic, regional, and racial lines entrenched in the country through a colonial political economy (Mukangara 2000; Burgess 2009). The Arabs were linked to the wealthy landowners, whereas the Shirazi were clove-producing peasants, and the Africans were working class (Mpangala 2006).

In December 10, 1963, Zanzibar gained full independence from Great Britain and the alliance between the two parties, ZPPP and ZNP formed the first Zanzibar government. This new government was led by the Chief Minister, and the Sultan stayed on as head of the State, which the ASP protested (Lofchie 1965; Omar 1996; Malipula 2003). A month after, January 12, 1964 the ASP led a violent uprising and overthrew the Sultan and the government that was under the coalition of ZPPP and ZNP. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGZ), also, known officially in Kiswahili as Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar (SMZ), was formed under the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) after the revolution. According to Burgess (2009), around this time, about one-third of the Arabs who resided in Zanzibar's main Island of Unguja were killed or forced to flee the islands soon after the revolution. The Arabs who stayed behind transformed from privileged minorities into second-class citizens; the ASP government excluded them from

government jobs and confiscated their land and all of their property. This transition did not help mend the broken racial and ethnic relations in the islands (Bakari 2006; Burgess 2009).

The Union arrangement between Tanganyika and Zanzibar came as a result of an attempt by the United States to make Zanzibar a military base, which other countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the USSR, did not like. As a result, the United Kingdom, which had colonized both countries, approached leaders of both sides to form a union as a defense mechanism against threats from the Omani sultanate, who wanted to come back to rule the island. On April 26, 1964, approximately three and a half months after the revolution, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed the union that created the United Republic of Tanzania. The agreement to form the union was signed by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika and Amani Karume of Zanzibar on April 22, 1964. Additionally, after the union's completion, the new federal government instituted socialist policies in the 1970s which banned all political parties, except for mainland Tanganyika's African National Union (TANU) and the Afro-Shirazi party (in Zanzibar). In 1977 the Zanzibar party, ASP merged with the mainland political party, TANU, to form the Revolutionary party known in Kiswahili as Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in May of 1977. The CCM stayed in power as the lone political party until the mid-1990s (Petterson 2002).

Despite the Union arrangement, Zanzibar maintained a semi-autonomous government and a president, with certain areas reserved for the Union e.g. Defense, Internal Affairs, National Revenue and International Affairs. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGZ) also known in Kiswahili as Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar (SMZ) remains autonomous and can independently carry out activities related to the development of Zanzibar, provided these

activities do not threaten the security of the country and are not contrary to national development objectives.

There were no elections conducted in Zanzibar from the time the union took shape in 1964 up to 1977, when the Tanganyika African Union (TANU) party and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) joined and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was born. In the meantime, elections were conducted on the mainland every five years from 1960 to the time the two political parties merged.

Post Socialist Multi party rule

In the 1980s and early 90s, as a result of the downfall of communism in the Soviet Union and its other Eastern Europe allies, the political and economic landscape in Tanzania changed. After the revolution of 1964 and during ASP and later CCM mono-party rule, Zanzibar was closed to visitors until the late 1980s. Tourism began in earnest with the policy of trade liberalization in the late 1980s, when Tanzania's socialist policies were shifting towards a market economy. Zanzibar sought to use its historical advantage by attracting visitors to the islands, which are nicknamed the "Spice Islands" due to their historical reliance on clove. This westernization had important social and economic consequences as we will see.

Tanzania, like many other African countries, embarked upon a reorganization of its political system. A major step was the change from single party political rule and privilege to a pluralist one in 1992. In Zanzibar, it was a chance for the banned political parties to come back to the political scene. One of these influential political parties from the 1970's returned under a

new name, the Civic United Front (CUF). It was formerly known as the Zanzibar National Party, and its members were predominantly of Arab descent.

Multi-party elections held in 1995, 2000 and 2005 were closely contested. Violence ensued when the leading political opponents, the African dominant *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) and the Arab dominant Civic United Front (CUF) appeared to perpetuate the 1957 -1964 racial, class based, regional, and ethnic divisions that exacerbate polarization and marginalization. In general, the political strongholds of CCM resemble the ASP, and CUF resembles the ZPPP and ZNP (Mmuya and Chaligha 1993). In addition, all elections conducted in this period were far from free and fair, as they were characterized by vote rigging and political violence.

These violent incidents were most obvious in the regions where rivalry between the two political parties (CUF and CCM) was strong. Numerous local and international observers expressed their dissatisfaction with vote rigging and other loopholes with respect to the elections of 1995. The election observer groups that expressed dissatisfaction with these elections included the Zanzibar Elections Monitoring Group (ZEMOG), OAU observers, the Unrepresented People's Organization (UNPO), United Nations (UN) observers, and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) (ZEMOG 1995).

Following the 1995 and 2000 elections, two reconciliation accords were signed but neither was ever implemented (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). The elections of 2000, like past elections, were followed by bloodshed in January 2001, when police murdered scores of demonstrators (Malipula 2003). Many Zanzibaris believed that the Zanzibar Electoral

Commission (ZEC), with the help of other state organs, ensured a win for the CCM in Zanzibar (Malipula 2003).

The killing of demonstrators led the CCM and the CUF to seek the second political accord (MUAFAKA II). The initial negotiations regarding MUAFAKA I between the parties took months, but eventually an agreement was reached with the goal of cooling down the increased tensions between the two camps. The accord agreed to a joint Presidential Committee that included members from both camps as well as the creation of an independent election commission; the Zanzibar Election Commission (ZEC), comprising members from both parties (Sheriff 2001; Malipula 2003). The MUAFAKA II negotiations started following the January 2001 violence (Malipula 2003). MUAFAKA II included some of the items from MUAFAKA I that were not implemented at the time of signing MUAFAKA II (Bakari and Makulilo 2012).

In October of 2010, a peace accord (*Muafaka III*) signed by the CCM and CUF formed a Government of National Unity (GNU). CUF was invited to the table and participated in governing Zanzibar with CCM. However, since then violent activities in the name of independence and religion have again been on the rise in Zanzibar. The unity government never addressed the grievances of the majority of citizens. Many still felt marginalized and betrayed by CUF, which they saw as a supporter of the status quo. This created a power vacuum and opened the door for radical clerics to incite violence (LeSage 2014).

Table 2: Religious and Electoral Violence in Zanzibar

Religious and Electoral Violence in Zanzibar	
Date	Event
October 15, 1995	In Pemba Island -Police tear gassed opposition rally leading to a stampede that injured 27 people as general elections nears.
October 29, 1995	Violence broke out in Zanzibar when protestors threw stones at police after the first results of island elections pointed to a clear victory for the CCM.
February 4, 1996	Civic United Front (CUF) boycotted the opening session of Zanzibar's new parliament. CUF had 24 seats while the CCM held 42 seats in the Zanzibar parliament.
April 16, 1996	CUF activists were accused of setting fire to schools and of bombing of a transformer of a power station, where Forty people were arrested.
January 4, 1998	In a preventive measure, Police prevented CUF members from holding a meeting in Zanzibar to protest the trial of 18 their arrested Members of Parliament.
February 11, 1998	CUF used the growing Muslim passion and supported the introduction of sharia law in Zanzibar with demonstrations that led to scores of supporters to be arrested.
January 27 and 29, 2001	Fatal demonstrations against the CCM and elections ensued in Zanzibar where 23 people were killed by police in Unguja and approximately 300 in Pemba, and other 2,000 in Pemba fled to Mombasa, Kenya.
March 6, 2004	UAMSHO (Awakening) group, protested after police banned its political rallies for security reasons. Police responded with tear gas, injuring seven and arresting 32.
March 20, 2004	Unknown individuals threw a hand grenade at the house of Zubeir Ali Maulid, the Zanzibar minister for communications and transport.
May 28, 2004	Zanzibar Police arrested Islamic activist -Sheikh Kurwa Shauri and was forced to return to Mainland Tanzania.
August 2, 2004	A bomb exploded at the CCM Mapinduzi Bomani branch office.
December 3, 2004	Violence erupted at a voter registration location when Army troops tried to register to vote. Three people were shot and one killed when Army for National Reconstruction (JKU) troops opened fire at the registration site.
March 6, 2005	Police raided homes in the Kilimahewa area in Zanzibar, arresting 13 people. In violence related to the upcoming October 2005 elections, 14 people were injured due to rivalries between the ruling CCM and the opposition CUF.
April 25, 2005	A bomb exploded at a house belonging to the ruling CCM. Three people have been arrested in conjunction with the attacks.
August 10, 2005	Three people were attacked and injured and three houses were burned in Stone Town in poll-related violence.

December 25, 2012	A Catholic priest shot on the chest by Muslim gunmen.
February 17, 2013	A Catholic priest was murdered by Muslim extremist on his way to church
February 19, 2013	Arsonist burned the Evangelical Church of Siloam in Zanzibar, act associated with growing religious extremism.
August 7, 2013	Two men in a moped threw acid at two British teenagers (18 years) who were volunteers in Zanzibar. The teens sustained burns.
September 13, 2013	Muslim extremists threw acid on a priest and badly burned him.
February 15, 2014	Bomb thrown inside Adventist church in Tomondo area in the outskirts of Zanzibar.
February 24, 2014	Bomb thrown and exploded inside the Assemblies of God church. No casualties, but the church badly damaged.
	Homemade bomb exploded near the gate of St. Monica Anglican Cathedral, damaging the wall and carport.
	Bomb exploded inside popular tourist hang-out –The Mercury Restaurant and Bar; no casualties.
<p><i>Source: BBC, BBC Monitoring reports 1998-2014; Xinhua 2002-2004; Reuters 2012-2013; Agence France Presse (AFP) 2014; Africa News 2014; US Department of State 2006; Minde 2014; Ippmedia 1999-2013; IRIN 1995-2015; Mwananchi Newspaper 1998-2011.</i></p>	

The Rise of Militant Neo-Fundamentalism --From Blue Guards to UAMSHO (AWAKENING)

CUF's militia arm – Blue Guard

The intense competition between the CUF and CCM led the CCM government to use brutality and repression to subdue CUF supporters in the 1995 and 2000 elections. Because the CUF leadership lacked government provided security, they formed their own vigilante group in the early 1990s called the Blue Guards, charged with ensuring party security i.e., leaders, buildings and property (Planète Afrique 2001, Wales Online 2005, Mwanahalisi 2012). In response, the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) also is said to have set up its own militia youth wing known as "Janjaweed" at the same time to combat the creation of the Blue Guards (The East African 11/06/2000, The Guardian 09/19/2000).

Since its inception in 1992, the CUF embodied a broad coalition of rural farmers, specifically from the island of Pemba, as well as business individuals and urban intellectuals (Cameron 2002). The CUF's election platform has reflected the contradictory economic interests of its coalition, human rights language, and constitutional reform that seeks an independent Zanzibar (Cameron 2002; Poncian 2014).

The Blue Guards and the CUF leadership have been vocal regarding the corruption, mismanagement, and discrimination in Zanzibar. They claim that the CCM is guilty of corruption and economic mismanagement; discrimination against people of Arab descent or the ones from Pemba; conceding too much sovereignty to the Union government over energy, customs duties, and security; politicization of the security forces and civil service as well as abuse of human rights (Rawlence 2005). Both the CCM and the CUF express dissatisfaction with the Union agreement and claim that the current arrangement has been abused by the Union government, especially regarding the issue of oil in 2005 when the then President Mkapa's administration unilaterally declared natural resources a Union matter and granted national exploration rights without consulting Zanzibar (Rawlence 2005).

It should be noted, however, that the CUF at one point called for a secular government and not a sharia-based one. Hence some people believe that CUF is connected to UAMSHO, although both the CUF and UAMSHO deny the link (Aljazeera 09/29/2012; Reuters 10/11/2012; Nipashe 11/05/2012).

UAMSHO

Meanwhile, the UAMSHO (AWAKENING) was formally founded in 2001 as a non-profit, non-governmental, primarily religious organization. They had been loosely organized since the late 1990s spreading Islamic religion on street corners. UAMSHO officially registered by its Swahili name, Jumuiya ya Uamsho na mihadhara ya kiislamu (JUMIKI) in 2001 but it has become more popularly known as UAMSHO (AWAKENING). Once Blue Guards' perceived influence on CUF's political direction, especially regarding the issues of independence for Zanzibar and the formation of a government of national unity, started to diminish in 2004, UAMSHO became more politically oriented, espousing the goal of uniting all Zanzibaris to push for separation from Tanzania (The East African 12/10/2000; Mwananchi 12/13/2000).

UAMSHO was formed by popular clerics who were said to be part of the CUF Blue Guards high ranking leadership (BBC Africa 11/16/2000; The Guardian 11/15/2000; The African Report 07/12/2012). The clerics who formed UAMSHO began offering public sermons in the 1990s, with no formal organizational structure or leadership hierarchy, but by mid-2011 they had totally transitioned from the CUF Blue Guard into a religious organization with a clear leadership hierarchy, a constitution, and a political platform (The Economist 11/02/2012, The Financial Times 12/28/2012, World Watch Monitor 03/17/2014).

According to Koenings (2015), UAMSHO's founding clerics succeeded in gaining support in Zanzibar due to the CCM government's relentless suppression of the CUF, which is considered by many to be an all-inclusive political party founded by intellectuals, farmers, business people and human rights activists ([www. Theafricanarguments.org](http://www.Theafricanarguments.org) 10/02/2015).

According to Burchard (2015), there are rumors that several CUF politicians are operating

indirectly through UAMSHO as they can no longer openly oppose government policy after the signing of agreement on the government of national unity in 2010. This move is widely believed to greatly propel UAMSHO's support in Zanzibar (Ching'ole 2015; Lopez Lucia 2015; LeSage 2014). Additionally, this gesture by CUF, which for long had the support of the majority of Zanzibaris, in joining CCM in GNU was seen as a betrayal by those Zanzibaris who remain economically behind their fellow citizens living in the mainland (Ching'ole 2015). UAMSHO uses the political and economic gap between Muslims and Christians as well as differences between mainlanders and Zanzibaris to attract supporters (Fair 2002; Malipula 2003).

UAMSHO has succeeded in funneling cultural and political tensions into support for radical Islamism. The group denies involvement in church burning, but openly feeds resentment of individuals from mainland Tanzania as we will discuss in the following chapters (The Toronto Star 12/15/2012).

According to UAMSHO's constitution, there is a need to return Zanzibar back to its nature as a center of Islamic religion in order to ensure the application of Islamic law in Zanzibar, along with full autonomy to decide its own affairs separate from the United Republic of Tanzania. UAMSHO members and supporters have continually voiced their displeasure with the failure of Zanzibar's government under the CCM to represent the island as a semi-autonomous region in the country, which the mainlanders have dominated politically for 48 years. UAMSHO asserts that most Zanzibaris feel marginalized, and that the island's rich history, prestige, and economy have been ruined.

UAMSHO began to take a more active role in Zanzibari politics in 2011. In its transition from being the CUF youth wing in 2010, UAMSHO began advocating for Muslim rights in

Zanzibar. In its critique of the revolutionary government UAMSHO uses the language of good governance and human rights, which is distinctive for a radical Islamic social movement (Heilman and Kaiser 2002; Haynes 2005). UAMSHO activists and supporters allege that the government is interfering in religious affairs, something that is contrary to Article 19 of the Constitution of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and the Union. Further, supporters of the movement blame the government for being corrupt and for its failure to enforce laws that regulate alcohol consumption and dress code in Zanzibar. The CCM government in Zanzibar responded to UAMSHO's claims by arguing that UAMSHO is promoting fundamentalist opinions (Turner 2009).

UAMSHO's message that Zanzibar was being left behind developmentally and not being allowed to embrace its Islamic identity (combined with speeches rallying populist anger against the wealth on display in Tanzania's tourist resorts) touched the core of many Zanzibaris' concerns (UAMSHO YouTube Rally 2011). UAMSHO argues that religion, specifically Islam, is the only way of liberating Zanzibar from the claws of the union with Tanganyika (Poncian 2014).

In 2011 and 2012, UAMSHO's popularity soared; their rallies were heavily attended and their YouTube videos and other internet postings attracted a lot of online traffic. Sheikh Farid Hadi Ahmed, the UAMSHO leader, began calling for the enforcement of a dress code for foreigners, tighter restrictions and regulations on alcohol consumption, and the establishment of an independent state of Zanzibar, with its own constitution based on Sharia law (Malipula 2003; Haynes 2005; Vittori et al 2009).

Zanzibar saw violent clashes concerning these demands during the summer of 2012, when the Zanzibar Police alleged that UAMSHO protesters set fire to two churches, setting off a clash with police. After this incident, approximately 30 people, including leaders and protesters, were arrested and the local authorities banned all religious demonstrations. According to Poncian (2014), despite the arrests, UAMSHO activities continued, with leaflets instructing Muslims to practice violence against Christians and to protest against both the union and the Zanzibari governments.

This call resulted in a series of violent acts at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013. On Christmas Day of 2012, a Roman Catholic priest was shot and wounded while returning home from church outside Zanzibar town. In February 2013, another Roman Catholic priest was shot and killed outside his church, while in August 2013 two British volunteer girls were attacked with acid in Zanzibar town. After these acts, the then Zanzibar Inspector General of Police, Said Mwema, stated that police could not rule out Al Qaeda or Al Shabab involvement in the attacks. However, the main concern was with the rapid increase in UAMSHO popularity in Zanzibar, especially among the youth (Daily News, 02/19/2013).

Regional Radicalization and current economy

Religious rioting and violence also occurred on mainland Tanzania, but not to the extent of what was happening in Zanzibar. Further, the difference between religious violence on mainland Tanzania and on Zanzibar is that on the mainland there no single religious organization that is as well supported and organized as UAMSHO. UAMSHO's base continues to grow as the majority of Zanzibar's impoverished population, especially the youth, is largely

motivated by resentment of foreign tourists, cultural decay, and growing unemployment (Malipula 2003; Vittori et al 2009). Muslim religious scholars have been very significant in setting guidelines for social behavior in Zanzibar (Vittori et al 2009), advocating heavily for enforcing dress codes and the closure of all businesses that serve alcohol (Turner 2002). As Zanzibar is a tourist center, shutting down establishments that sell alcohol would weaken the already diminished economy, which is another source of discontentment. The clerics leading the rise of radicalism portray the secular state as a threat to Muslim traditions, calling for a return to basics in order to protect the Islamic way of life (Turner 2002).

Table 3: Significant Political Developments in Zanzibar

Significant Political Developments in Zanzibar	
Date	Event
December 10, 1963	Zanzibar received its independence as a Constitutional monarchy from the British.
January 12, 1964	Zanzibar Revolution: The Sultan and coalition government constituted ZPPP and ZNP where overthrown and ASP under Abeid Amani Karume took over. All political parties were banned, allowing ASP to be the only political party in Zanzibar.
April 26, 1964	The Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania.
February 5, 1977	Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) merged to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (The Revolutionary Party). This cemented Tanzania as a single party democracy, as political parties were not allowed by the constitution.
May 28, 1992	Civic United Front (CUF) (Chama cha Wananchi) was officially formed as a merger between two movements –KAMAHURU a democratization movement and Civic Movement a human rights movement.
July 1, 1992	Tanzania constitution amended to allow multiparty politics.
January 21, 1993	CUF received full recognition as a registered political party from the registrar of political parties.
October 29, 1995	First multi-party elections held in Zanzibar. International observers reported that the elections were not free and fair.

November 1998	Eighteen CUF officials were arrested and charged with treason, and later released.
June 9, 1999	Muafaka I (first peace accord agreement) between the CUF and CCM signed.
October 29, 2000	Second multiparty elections held, marred with irregularities and voters' fraud. CUF lost to CCM and protest broken out.
2001	UAMSHO officially founded and registered as a non-profit NGO with the registrar of non-governmental organizations in Zanzibar.
October 10, 2001	Muafaka II (second peace accord) signed between the CUF and CCM, although the CUF factions (Blue Guards and UAMSHO) opposed the agreement.
March 5, 2003	UAMSHO organized an illegal demonstration, supported by the CUF. The demonstration was against government ban on their demonstration and refusal to acquire a permit as stipulated by Mufti law of 2001.
April 19, 2004	The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar passes a law that outlaws gay and lesbian practices in Zanzibar, as a result of pressure from UAMSHO clerics and the CUF.
July 12, 2005	UAMSHO leadership calls on the US government to stop torture of prisoners held in Iraqi jails, also wanted the prisoners confined in Guantanamo Bay to be released unconditionally.
October 30, 2005	Third multiparty general elections held. CUF lost and international observers reported rampant irregularities and fraud. CUF assisted by Blue Guards/UAMSHO organized nationwide demonstrations after the election results announced and refused to recognize the new elected government.
November 5, 2009	CCM's Amani Karume (Zanzibar President) met with the CUF's Maalim Seif and agreed upon the government of national unity after 2010 elections.
August 10, 2010	Zanzibar constitution amended to allow the formation of the government of national unity. The CUF and CCM signed agreement creating the government of national unity. UAMSHO refuses to support this move by the CUF
October 31, 2010	General elections held nationwide. CCM won again. CUF accepted the results, which made Maalim Seif, the first Vice President. UAMSHO objected to this move.
November 1, 2010	UAMSHO started organizing demonstrations demanding Zanzibar independence and actively taking part in Zanzibar political scene.
July 1 –December 2012	Opinions solicited for constitutional reforms in Tanzania, including matters of the Union between the mainland and Zanzibar. UAMSHO encouraged its supporters to take part in this process and denounce the Union.
<p><i>Source: BBC Monitoring Reports 1995-2014; Reuters 1998 -2010; Xinhua 2005-2016; AFP 2006; ION 2004-2006; Africa News 2002-2013; US Department of State 2006; Minde 2014; Ippmedia 1999-2013; IRIN 1995-2015; Mwananchi Newspaper 1998-2011.</i></p>	

UAMSHO clerics have capitalized on the failure of older government-controlled Muslim institutions, offering Muslims, especially the youth, alternatives to reignite their beliefs, including new interpretations of and alternative avenues to the study of Islam. UAMSHO's translation of the Qur'an into Swahili has broken that the monopoly of Arabic-speaking scholars, and that the Qur'an is now readily available to every literate person (Haynes 2005). Additionally, there are plenty of Islamic CDs, DVDs, tapes, and writings, all available and accessible in the different languages spoken in Zanzibar (Arabic, Swahili and English) (Haynes 2005). These items are readily available in bookstores, from street vendors, and outside mosques, especially after Friday prayers. All of these allows for a broader range of religious interpretation due to a level of abundance and accessibility that never existed before (Vittori et al. 2009).

Summary

In this chapter I presented the historical background of Zanzibar's racial and political landscape. This demonstrated the fact that globalization to Zanzibar is not a new phenomenon, as the Middle and Far East traders, and the European imperialism first exposed Zanzibar to the outside world. Suffice to say, Zanzibar as a modern city of the 19th century was much influenced by the movement of goods, capital and labor through the Indian Ocean trade link to the rest of the world, hence receiving its influences from the outside world in terms of culture, religion, economy and politics.

Further, I discussed the origins of the current political violence as a response to the formation of the government of National Unity that the CUF and CCM political parties signed in 2010. This created a vacuum for the rise of UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group, which is a militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement aimed at awakening Zanzibar's impoverished population, especially its youth to stand up and reclaim their country from what they call colonization of Tanganyika (the mainland Tanzania). UAMSHO employs the language of good governance and human rights and exploits feelings of resentment toward foreign tourists, cultural decay, and growing unemployment in order to try and unify Zanzibaris of all persuasions and incite religious violence.

Islam in Zanzibar throughout its history had created a widespread religious environment that was very conducive to inter-racial political unity. This environment provided the Arab leaders with the basic ingredients for an effective appeal for African political support based on common faith. Many Arabs and Africans therefore shared not only the same religion, but also the various institutions and practices which accompanied it such as mosques, Qur'anic schools, holidays, rituals and common ceremonies (Lofchie 1965; Sheriff 2001). However, the economic divisions that operated along racial lines remained a divisive basis for political loyalty (Lofchie 1965).

CHAPTER 5

FOREIGN AID AND INVESTMENT

This chapter will present my findings and analysis as pertaining to foreign aid and investment (Western and Mid-East investments and aid) a theme developed from the interviews, field notes, and also data drawn from secondary quantitative studies. Through my interactions with UAMSHO activists in 2004, field observation, and secondary data analysis, I found that one of the key aspects of globalization that my interviewees identified was foreign aid and investment. But what I found was that while they saw Western investment as a key source of grievances and used that to motivate action, investment and aid from the Mid-East provided crucial resources that led to the evolution of UAMSHO from a modest religious group to a militant neo-fundamentalist organization.

Financial and material conditions in Zanzibar

Throughout my fieldwork in Zanzibar, the activists expressed to me their frustration with the government, poor living conditions, unemployment, human rights issues and societal decay. Data from the interviews I conducted with activists in 2004 and from the International Labor Organization's (ILO) country report indicated that the economy of Zanzibar is mainly dependent on tourism and also financial and technical support from private and governments of the Western or Mid-East countries in support of most developmental projects such as completion of classrooms, building and repairs of health centers/clinics, medical equipment

purchases, repairs of water supply networks, and capacity building in Zanzibar (Zanzibar–EFA Country Report 2000). This set up a clear inequality in who receives these funds. Further, from what I discovered, most of the funds to support infrastructural and service needs as well as political and religious activities of the Arab populations came from NGOs, not the Zanzibari government.

Mid-East Investments and Donors

As I have pointed earlier, Zanzibar economy is dependent on foreign aid and investments from Western and Mid-Eastern nations. Most NGOs in Zanzibar depend on these funds particularly for their day to day operation and sustaining various community programs. According to the UAMSHO activists I spoke with in 2004, they receive funding for their various activities from foreign donors, investors, and NGOs operating in Zanzibar. This is what one UAMSHO official, Rahim, told me:

I have worked for Al-Noor charity for the past year and we get our funding from individual rich financiers in Dubai and Saudi Arabia. We are a fairly new foreign financed religious civil society, specifically to help our Muslim brothers and sisters to achieve higher goals. We have many projects including a radio station, mosque, modern computer lab with internet and a modern madrasa for our community plus we have scholarships for our teachers and students for study trips in Khartoum, Omani and Abu Dhabi.

What Rahim expressed is true in most parts of the East African region as Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work as catalysts for spreading political Islam as well as providing basic services. In this case, faith is combined with material reward in appealing to the poor and creating indigenous African Islamic fundamentalist movements such as the UAMSHO.

In the years surrounding the formation of UAMSHO, there was a spike in a number of registered NGOs operating in Zanzibar. A policy publication (2009) of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar indicated that the number of registered NGOs increased from 90 to 510 from 1998 to 2007 (RGZ 2009). Thus, it appears that NGOs sponsored by Islamic States from the Arabian Peninsula play a crucial role in fostering Islamic activism at the grassroots, building Islamic schools, mosques, internet infrastructures, and news and entertainment media such as radio and television stations as well as maintenance of various activities such as basic education, healthcare, youth associations and cooperatives. This is what Mahmoud told me when I interviewed him in 2004 that the aid they receive provides needed infrastructure as well as fostering certain religious and political goals:

We get most of our help financially from our brethren in Qatar, Saudi and Kuwait. To be honest with you Mr. Deo, they help us with many things, as you have witnessed, we can't sustain ourselves and sadly the government is not even in a situation to help us, some places children have to study under a tree or make shift class with grass roof, no desks, therefore the help we get goes far. For starters, the money helps so much to advance our goals, we can build madrasas, mosques and our radio station gets help so that we can be able to maintain it. This is for the betterment of all Muslims in Zanzibar; we need to start running, so that we can take back our country. Islam will lead us there, it will give us the discipline and knowledge to proceed, it's all for the good course of improving the lives of our people, inshallah we will get there.

When I asked Mahmoud to be specific if the help is from individuals or government, he responded by saying that the money came from the governments of these countries:

We don't get much help from individuals, this is strictly financial help from governments, remember they understand what we are going through here and what we want to achieve, their goal is just like ours, to advance the goals of our religion and improve our people's lives.

An example of an NGO that I visited is the Al Noor charity located in Zanzibar, funded by private and public money from the governments of Sudan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. It operates a radio station and a publication company, and is heavily invested in local religious schools known

as madrasas. Due to the work of these NGOs and lack of funding from the government in support of basic education, the community-based religious schools or madrasas have become prevalent in Zanzibar. In 2004, I found that madrasas were already extremely common; they literally could be found at every block or so in Zanzibar. According to a UNESCO report (2007) in 1999 there were 45 religious schools but by 2007 there were 1,902 Quranic/religious schools (UNESCO: EFA 2007 Country Reports –Tanzania, Zanzibar).

The Zanzibar Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs, Mr. Abubakar Khamis Bakari, reiterated that there are about 2,000 or so madrasas in Zanzibar, and all privately owned (Mark 2015). When responding to questions in the House of Representative in January 2015, Mr. Bakari stated that to curb the current trend of madrasas as a breeding grounds for extremism, the government will start registering all community schools and provide a uniform curriculum (Mark 2015). In 2004 I interviewed Rahim, ranking UAMSHO official, who insisted on the fact that madrasas is not a new phenomenon in Zanzibar as they were present before British colonial occupation and the fact that many Zanzibaris were literate when colonialist arrived in the island:

Mr. Deo, these madrasas you see around here are not new, they have been here since the first contact with our brothers from the Arabia. The madrasas have been learning centers, where our children learn how to read, write, count, recite and connect to our religion. Let me tell you this, when the Portuguese and later British arrived here, our people were literate, so I'm surprise now all sudden they are an issue as a source of extremism. I think that is negative connotation instilled by the West.

Rahim's sentiments were also expressed by most activists I spoke with stating that the presence of madrasas is the best thing that can happen to Zanzibar, as madrasas present the only hope to keep the spirit of Islam as religion and culture going. According to Sengendo (2016) the current clerics and sheikhs who are working in reigniting Muslims around East Africa,

have been products of these madrasas. Sengendo (2016) pointed out that some of the graduates from these madrasas have been able to secure scholarships to countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman, Kuwait, Libya, and Sudan. Many attended influential Islamic universities like Al-Azhar in Cairo, Islamic University in Madina, and Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, where they studied, at times up to doctorate, and returned as accomplished clerics injecting their energy back to the communities (Sengendo 2016).

Madrasas have continued to be central in teaching Muslim children Islam and its culture in Zanzibar. Due to availability of funds from various international NGOs such as Munadhamat Al-dawa Al-Islamiyyah, Muslim World League, Africa Muslims Agency, International Islamic Charitable Organization, and the Aga Khan Foundation, the condition of the madrasas has improved tremendously (Sengendo 2016). Further, it is also clear that these funds and the support of these Islamic NGOs helps not only in building schools and mosques but also in providing fundamentalist religious pamphlets and texts that promote a narrow definition of Jihad and normalizing this use of the word as part of people's daily vocabulary.

The research Salih (2002) reaffirmed what most activists I spoke with in 2004 expressed to me, that Islamic NGOs founded in East Africa have been the bridge for spreading political Islam where faith combined with material reward is used to motivate the poor and to establish African Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movements. Falk (1995), Ekins (1992), Boli and Thomas (1999), contend that for the new culture of global civic societies NGOs are crucial political actors looking to improve people's lives in the spheres of economic competence, environmental issues, and human rights. However, my study found that Zanzibar not only depends on NGOs, but also on other foreign financiers, especially from the Middle East, in

order to improve Zanzibaris' lives. In stressing the importance of the NGOs and foreign financiers who donate towards the movements' cause in Zanzibar, here is what Abdallah, a UAMSHO official, told me:

We have brothers in Saudi and Omani who are helping us with our course financially, where without their donations we would not be able to operate. I cannot disclose how much we are receiving every six months, but it is a very good sum of money to assist us with all the operation costs, including marketing and production of leaflets, internet access, computers, and traveling costs. In addition, we have the ability to send our talented youths to study in any of these countries to enhance our organization.

Currently, many countries have enacted or tightened existing anti-terrorist laws in order to make it difficult to finance radical and violent religious organizations around the world. However, Haynes (2005) and Ghandour (2002) point out that it has become exceptionally hard for intelligence agencies from the West to be able to detect, restrict, and prevent monetary aid supplied to finance radical movements that use violence because they use NGOs, which act as brokers, shielding their money trails. In this study, I also found that NGOs play a crucial role in financing most civic society activities, including funding the UAMSHO. Also, just like Haynes (2005) my study confirmed that the connection between influential Islamic financiers and radical Islamic social organizations is indirect and every difficult to trace. Hence, it has become easier for organizations such as Islamic NGOs to finance and build schools or madrasas in the name of poverty reduction in the Third World (Haynes 2005).

Brahm (2002) noted that some social movements and NGOs around the world are viewed as supporting opposition to globalization because they strive to provide vision on important issues such as equal standing on matters of economic competence, environmental

protection, human rights, good governance, and poverty reduction. This is true of UAMSHO in Zanzibar, as testified by the UAMSHO activists I spoke with.

Western foreign investments

I found that the individuals I interviewed identified globalization, framed as Western foreign investment, as very important in their activities. The ill effects of this kind of globalization motivated their organizing. In this section I will discuss the current economic situation of Zanzibar and the economic changes that led to this, as well as the issues that my interviewees identified as important

The macroeconomic reforms carried out in the 1980s helped Zanzibar attract significant foreign investment, particularly in the areas of communication, transportation, and tourism. Zanzibar's economy is centered on private enterprise, where the Revolutionary Government plays a critical role in the planning, development, and promotion of balanced social development and economic growth.

In the 1980s, Zanzibar undertook macroeconomic reforms that allowed the country to attract significant foreign direct investment, specifically in the areas of communication, transportation, and tourism (RGZ: Non-Governmental Organizations Policy 2009). The majority of investment is said to be coming from the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Oman, Italy, United Kingdom, United States and Canada (ZATI 2012). The Zanzibar economy has registered growth rates averaging 6.2% over the five years from 2006-2010 with a per capita income of TZS 764,000 (USD 561) in 2010. Economic growth is dominated by the service sector which

represented over 49% of GDP in 2010 (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar: Non-Governmental NGOs Policy 2009).

Tourism is a leading industry in Zanzibar and since 2002 has been declining due to fear of terrorism and political instability, but remains a leading source of revenue for the islands, although cloves, other spices, and seaweed, also are grown for export. Tourism brings in the most revenue and also employs the most people, while the public sector employs less than 10% of the estimated 450,000-person work force. Since the terrorist attacks in World Trade Center in September 2001 to 2004, the tourism industry in Zanzibar faced major declines. These declines have been compounded by political instability following the general elections of 1995 and 2000 (Zanzibar Tourism Sector Profile Report 2006).

The Zanzibar Commission on Tourism (ZCT) (2006) reported that although the tourism industry recorded some declines in 2002, it still has the largest impact on Zanzibar economy. ZCT indicated that as a proportion to GDP, tourism was 14% and expected to grow up to 21% in 2012. Tourism increased the per capita income between 1998-2001 from USD 219 to USD 248 and directly employs approximately 5,800 people and other 37,000 through other sectors related to tourism (ZCT 2006).

However, the activists I spoke with were not employed in the tourism sector, and identified self-employment as artisans, fishermen, subsistence farmers as their main forms of occupation. Due to the spike of NGOs in Zanzibar, jobs with civic society association and community development projects are also major sources of employment. In addition, the clove farmers are in a panic due to their leading cash crop's fast decline in terms of both production and sales in the world market. Cloves have accounted for over three-fourths of

Zanzibar's total export revenue, although crops such as coconuts, limes, tobacco, and other agricultural products are also produced.

Table 4: Zanzibar's tourists arrivals by Country/Continent

2000-2003 Zanzibar's Tourists Arrivals by Country/Continent								
Year	Italy	United Kingdom	Other Europe	Europe Total	North America	Other Africa	Rest of the World	Total
2000	25769	16307	29368	71439	7757	8718	9251	97165
2001	14510	13147	25738	53395	6328	7500	9106	76329
2002	25044	13012	14509	52565	6448	7887	7715	74615
2003	18586	7945	24610	51141	4334	6866	6024	68365

Source: Zanzibar Commission of Tourism (2006)

Thus, Zanzibar's economic policies have set up the country's reliance on large scale and elite driven tourism as the main source of income, obstructing true economic changes, and preventing education and infrastructure investment that would benefit the whole island, which is a disadvantage for Zanzibar's poor. Although there has been an influx of tourists in Zanzibar, almost 65% of the local population lacks the necessities to conduct their daily lives, such as access to basic health care, education, electricity, clean water, and jobs (Zanzibar –EFA Country Report 2000).

According to the Zanzibar Statistical Outlook (RGZ) of 2010, unemployment is estimated at 35% for youth, and people live on \$48 per month. UAMSHO activists I interviewed spoke of the struggles of obtaining employment and the low quality of life after almost 54 years of independence. One activist pointed out that he is unemployed and has nothing to look forward to except participating in the movement. UAMSHO thus has been able to capitalize on rampant unemployment by appealing to the youth, by focusing their efforts in pointing to the absence of opportunities. The Economist (11/03/2012) interviewed a high-level official of Zanzibar's

Chamber of Commerce, who reported that the real unemployment rate was much higher, with unemployment or underemployment youth estimated at 85%. Aisha, one of the UAMSHO activists and organizers, was typical:

I'm one of the lucky youth that have a job I won't be wrong if I can tell you that more than 80% of youth under 30 years of age do not have work, you are the witness, you can see them roaming the streets, what will they do? They follow our leaders because there is special appeal there, that is where they get their hopes, at least if they get scholarships and go to study in Sudan or Saudi they can make something out of nothing, which is what they have right now.

Rahim, a UAMSHO official I interviewed, explained to me that this made it relatively easy for the UAMSHO to recruit new members:

It's not hard to recruit new members of our group because of poverty and most have nothing to look forward to. The indigenous people do not own most investments as you see here, Mr. Deo, these are foreign companies, which hire foreigners and leave our people jobless. Now, as you see all the political parties have failed, they have failed a regular Zanzibari, so what we can do now is join forces as people, people power will never fail, and we can take back our country. Mr. Deo, we speak for all Muslims in Zanzibar, they are the ones with no platform or opportunity to advance their agenda at this point.

The UAMSHO activists constantly aired their grievances, and appeared very defensive speaking about their ways of life, especially their dislike of the foreign influences and lack of opportunities for locals, which seem to be engulfing Zanzibar's society. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar deliberately encouraged foreign direct investment in the tourism sector from the early 1990s as a way to create employment opportunities for all Zanzibaris. Zanzibar has seen a spike of the foreign direct investments in tourism of 14.6%, from USD 159.6 million to 182.9 million by the end of 2009; however, there has been no real increase in terms of employment opportunities for Zanzibaris (Ali and Ngude 2015).

Furthermore, the interviews I conducted indicate that globalization is significant to UAMSHO's activists and had a great influence on the process of radicalization. 87.5% (35 out of 40) of activists I interviewed told me that globalization and neo-liberalism to them means exposing the country to outside influences, be it economic or cultural. The activists stated that globalization brings new ways of life, social freedom, economic freedom, free trade, cheap communication and global interconnectedness. These come with a lot of negatives, although the activists also pointed to some positives, including connecting to the outside world more easily.

Most activists I interviewed, however, blame globalization and foreign investments (specifically from the West) for the current Zanzibari political chaos, human rights violations, poverty, and social decay. According to them, there is a need to rescue Muslims from these evils, in order to return the country to its traditional state. This is what Abdul, a very active member of UAMSHO, told me in 2004 in response to my question of why the movement focuses so much on the negatives of globalization:

In the name of globalization many things have happened. Zanzibar has been a dump of all evils; prostitution, drugs, theft and alcoholism is rampant these days as the youth have nowhere to run to, the Union government does not want to do anything, rather bringing more foreign investors who do not hire our own people, which do not help at all. Zanzibar used to be a very good place, people had morals then, but since the globalization story, things have changed, and thus why we are working hard to return our country to its religious roots. We have to start small, rescuing Muslims one by one, addressing them as individuals and not like they are part of a large group, this way they will pay attention.

What Abdul told me was echoed by other UAMSHO activists whom I had a chance to interview. Activists view globalization and foreign investment negatively because it's hard to see the benefits of tourism as the income do not trickle down as most people still live in

poverty without basic necessities. Tourism in Zanzibar has been taunted as door to a better Zanzibar with improved infrastructure and public services to benefit all; however, for activists this is not true.

Summary

In this chapter, I presented data and analysis from primary-level coding that produced memo codes and secondary-level coding resulting in the theme Foreign aid and investment (Western and Mid-East investments). Thus, I found that one of the key aspects of globalization that my interviewees identified was foreign aid and investment. Foreign aid and investment (Western and Mid-East investments) in Zanzibar worked in two ways as a catalyst for the emergence of UAMSHO. Interviewees saw Western investment as a key source of grievances and used that to motivate action. My analysis of secondary quantitative data regarding foreign aid and investment showed that Western investment built on the prior history of class divisions to create poverty, particularly among individuals of Arab descent.

Second, investment by Mid-Eastern NGOs helped build a structure and framework for organizations to spread political Islam where faith is combined with material reward appealing to the poor. Investment and aid from the Mid-East provided crucial resources that led to the evolution of UAMSHO from a modest religious group to a militant neo-fundamentalist organization.

CHAPTER 6

TECHNOLOGY

In this chapter I will present the findings, analysis and discussion pertaining to the theme: technology. From the interviews and field notes, I found that interviewees themselves identified technology as a key aspect of globalization. However, they saw this as positive and explained how it was key in their mobilizing activities. I then supplement their descriptions with data drawn from secondary quantitative studies. This category addresses the research question: What is the role of communication technologies in militant neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations in Zanzibar? Not only do the activists identify communications as important, I find that it is this technology that has provided an important resource that has allowed these more militant and neo-fundamentalist messages to overtake more traditional religious views among the population.

According to the literature on new technologies, technology use is considered one of the major aspects of globalization in today's world, specifically the communication and information technology of the internet, which has been embraced by Muslim revivalists around the world. The use of new information technology has two major effects that intertwine: one is the shrinking of national sovereignty, as borders are being broken down and, two, the shrinkage of distance, as individuals around the world are able to communicate and interact, exchanging information in a real time.

What I found is that communication and information technology is an important mobilization mechanism for UAMSHO actors. First, they are able to reconnect easily and cheaply with their brothers and sisters in the diaspora and, second, there is an increase in activists' political participation. 82.5% of the activists I interviewed indicated that the increased role of the internet has been a catalyst for their increased political participation in Zanzibar. Third, this is significant because it means that clerics and mosque sheikhs no longer had a monopoly when it comes to interpretation and access to the holy Qur'an. To activists, this means they now have ability to access, read and share the holy Qur'an without going through clerics or sheikhs.

As stated above, the Information technology was an important mobilization mechanism for UAMSHO activists when I visited in 2004, where they used social media sites such as Darhotwire, free-Zanzibar blogspot and their own blogspot to post important communication messages, recruitment activities and speeches of their popular clerics. Also, UAMSHO used mass text messaging, emailing and print media to reach their supporters. Further, today the activists are increasingly using cellular phones to access other more recent social media platforms such as WhatsApp, blogs, Facebook even using video sharing sites such as YouTube to communicate and recruit members.

One of the major surprises when I arrived in Zanzibar was the number of people who are connected to the World Wide Web (www) through their cellular phones. This observation was confirmed by data from the Pew Research Center, where 73% of adults in Tanzania reported daily use of mobile phones for multiple purposes, including access to the internet (Pew Research Center 2014). As I pointed earlier, during my fieldwork in 2004, I observed most

activists within UAMSHO use their cell phones on a regular basis communicating or reading the holy Qur'an texts available through either the UAMSHO website or other Islamic blogs that translate the Qur'anic texts to Swahili. This development allows Muslims who otherwise did not have access to Qur'an texts and audio in either Arabic or in Kiswahili to be exposed to many different interpretations of the Qur'an. This is significant because it means that local clerics and mosque sheikhs no longer have a monopoly when it comes to how the holy Qur'an should be read.

During my time in the field in 2004, I was fortunate to visit the community courtyard called the Jaw's Corner located at Stone Town area called Mkunazini. The Jaw's corner was very popular with CUF, Blue Guards and UAMSHO members, who met every day after evening prayers and discuss politics. This place at the center of Stone Town consists of an empty space in with benches in the middle for people to sit, a folding table with some chairs, a television set hanging at a corner above a fruit vendor's table, and three coffee kettles in a charcoal grill. The setting is surrounded with shops, kids' game arcades and an internet café. Importantly Jaw's corner is between 2-5 minutes' walk to other internet cafés around Stone Town.



Figure 2: Jaw's corner with CUF's flags and election posters.

Jaw's Corner was a significant site for UAMSHO formation. There members got easy access to internet through the available café in the courtyard or among many in the walking distance from the courtyard. Further, it should be noted that the readily available accessibility of internet helped the activists in their quest to communicate and receive vital information from their supporters around the world. In 2004, approximately 85% of activists (34 out of 40) I spoke with had email addresses and not only knew how to navigate their way through the internet but also read news and obtained other information through internet. Therefore, the access to the internet allowed activists to access different listservs, and free blogspots. This was supplemented by the fact that all activists I spoke with had cell phones and were communicating in the group through mass text messaging or conference calling.

Cellular Phones

Although I was surprised by the number of cellular phones common among these political activists in 2004, since then the usage has increased even more in Zanzibar's general population. According to the 2014 research from the Pew Research Center majority of adults in Tanzania (including Zanzibar) own a cellular phone. It should be noted that most parts of Zanzibar are underdeveloped; the availability of landlines is non-existent, so about 73% of citizens depend solely on their cellular phones for daily communication including access to the internet (Pew Research Center 2014).

According to the same research, 80% of the individuals surveyed in Tanzania use their cellular phones for sending and receiving text messages, 30% for money transfers, 21% for political news, 19% for access to social networks, 17% to access health information and 17% to look for jobs. The proliferation of mobile communications has transformed how people communicate in Zanzibar. Mobile phone networks have allowed Zanzibar to skip the landline stage of development and go straight to the digital age. In 2002, roughly one in ten Tanzanians owned a cellular phone with contrast to present where roughly seven in ten Tanzanians owned a cellular phone and were connected to the World Wide Web (Pew Research Center 2014). It should be noted that all the activists I interviewed in 2004 owned a cellular phone.

Smith (2001) and Garrett (2006) stress the role of information technology as an important mobilization platform for social movement actors around the world. Similarly, I found that the UMASHO activists used their cellular phones to access social media platforms such as YouTube, WhatsApp, blogs, and Facebook in order to communicate with and recruit members. For Garrett (2006), information technology promotes the formation of collective

identities as the participation of individuals creates the perception that they are part of a larger community by virtue of the grievances they share. The use of technology not only reduces distance but also helps in UAMSHO's recruitment efforts.

Blogs, Facebook and YouTube

UAMSHO use a dedicated web page, blog, Facebook and a variety of social media platforms including video sharing site YouTube to reach their audience. Some UAMSHO leaders credit this to the forces of globalization. The use of technology promoted UAMSHO's collective identity and allowed activists to feel a part of a larger community with shared grievances. It should be noted that in 2004 I observed activists extensive use of first listservs, then blogs such as the popular neo-fundamentalist blogspot Free-Zanzibar and Mzalendo. More recently UAMSHO started their own blogspot. Further, in 2004, one of the high-ranking officials of UAMSHO I interviewed spoke of using technology as a way of attracting young people and as a means for Islam as a religion to accomplish the goal of being a universal community of believers. In 2004, the then 25-year old Ahmad, a UAMSHO activist who maintains UAMSHO's social media platforms, including presently posting videos to YouTube, told me the significance of technology use and the platform technology provide to the youth, that technology gave youth a voice:

This technological revolution has pretty much provided most of my generation with a voice that we never had, it's much easier to read the Qur'an and listen to our clerics through the internet or mobile phones than picking up a Qur'an itself or old style print from my mosque to read at home. Most of us young people we identify ourselves with the digital age. We spend time communicating easily on Facebook, Myspace, Darhotwire, Jamii (Community) Forum, our own UAMSHO blog and we can connect better and faster through WhatsApp. We have our own online communities and we can reach many of our members that way. To answer part of your

question definitely technology has brought us closer as a group and afforded us tools that we never had before, where it is so easy to mobilize my group right now.



Figure 3: Some of the UAMSHO's YouTube videos indicating number of views as of 2012.

When I asked Ahmad how technology has helped them achieve their movement goals this is what he told me:

Some of the older people in our movement did not jump on the technology bandwagon when we started, they believed that as Muslims we have to keep the traditions of our religion, but to say the truth, this has allowed us to organize meetings faster, without even government to interfere with us until the last minute when our meeting is going live or at times even the end before the police and the military are sent in. Further, we can meet and send messages easier and share video faster. People all over the world know who we are because of technology, which is a big catalyst and boost to our movement.

What Ahmad told me confirmed the impact of technology not only to movements such as UAMSHO but to other Islamic social movements at large.

Importantly, Muslim women have used technology to participate in the movement in ways that they were never able to before. Muslim women in Zanzibar mostly are stay-at-home mothers, hence technology has afforded them the ability to study the Qur'an and participate in different religious activities.



Figure 4: Women activists participating in a rally in 2004

UAMSHO activists pointed out that globalization, with all its evils, has helped them to reconnect with their brothers and sisters around the world, where they get financial help and also can travel as I pointed out in the previous chapters and technologies that provide new tactics to help with their movement. This is what Salim, one of the high-ranking officials of UAMSHO, said when speaking on the benefits of globalization:

I didn't mean to paint globalization as a bad thing, there are some good things, including it's much easier to communicate with our brothers around the world cheaper and faster, we get our wire transfers quickly and we don't need to travel anywhere, we can get everything fast right here."

Another activist described globalization as a catalyst in opening up means of communication through technologies and allowed activists to communicate with the outside world more easily, cheaply, and quickly.

The UAMSHO activists I spoke with agreed that new technological advancements have promoted an unprecedented degree of interaction among Muslims not only within Zanzibar but also around the Islamic Diaspora. They are most excited when discussing advancements in information technology that have allowed them to communicate with their supporters and other activists around the world in real time. Speaking of the importance of technology and the role of Islam in Zanzibar, Sheikh Msellem had this to say during his speech to UAMSHO activists in one of his open lectures held at Dimani, Zanzibar on April 29, 2012, one of many posted in UAMSHO's YouTube channel:

Muslims around the world have this unique opportunity to connect and reconnect through technology, and follow God's ways. This is to say that, we, the clerics, are the ones supposed to be the leaders, and show the mass how to follow God's will.

Today UAMSHO activists, like those in many other militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist movements around the world, actively use modern communication platforms and technology to recruit new members. There are more than 30 YouTube videos of speeches by UAMSHO officials from different rallies around Zanzibar. The YouTube videos and other materials are distributed either through WhatsApp instant messaging, Facebook or UAMSHO's blog and webpage help to mobilize the activists as this has become the most important platform for their political participation. When I spoke to Juma in 2004, an activist who helps UAMSHO with strategic technology use and coordinates missionary work for recruitment of new members, he already recognized the importance of today's technology use and how it will benefit UAMSHO:

Mr. Deo, when it comes to the use of modern technology I can tell you that all hands-on deck, we are doing everything we can to "AWAKENING" our people who have been in slumber for a long time. We have videos from our open-air lectures, we post those in the internet (YouTube), and we have many people watching them and sending us their comments through email or texting. In addition, we are active in other forms of media, old school way, such as through our

radio programs at Al-Noor Radio, we publish weekly pamphlet/newsletter; we produce a lot of CDs and Cassettes for those people that we cannot reach otherwise. So we have a lot of platforms that helps us in advancing our movement goals, and believe me, they all bring us together, as our goal is self-governance and independence from the colonial Tanganyika and their Christian rule.

Further, I found that UAMSHO also uses modern day missionaries, who go door to door, to achieve recruitment goals and provide access to the translated Qur'an and other Islamic literature in Kiswahili by means of DVDs, Cassettes and CDs. UAMSHO's goal is to complement the modern technology with the opportunity for face-to-face recruitment. In addition, I found that UAMSHO uses mass media to their benefit via radio and TV programs, newspaper articles, and the use of apps as a means of informing their members.

Walking through the streets of Zanzibar town in 2004 I witnessed an abundance of Islamic literature, DVDs, CDs, and cassettes that street vendors sell cheaply. Further, radio programs could be heard around the town and Islamic newspapers that support the UAMSHOs movement were widely available.



Figure 5: Interesting sign inviting free international calls however the telephone was not a working set.

Mazrui (2001) stresses that modern technology has provided Islam with a new opportunity to accomplish its goal of a universal community of believers in a new way. Further, he argues that the network of relationships created has given new energy to the transnational nationalism of the Muslim Ummah, with a leadership drawn mainly from the ranks of middle class. My study found that there is indeed an increased level of the UAMSHO activists' use of social media sites such as YouTube, where officials post speeches.

My study thus confirmed what is already known in the literature: that the process of globalization through information technology and electronic media has encouraged the proliferation of radical religious thinking and played a role in diminishing the role of race, ethnicity and the state as a foundation of identity for many people around the world (Haynes 2014). In Zanzibar, the presence of the new media platforms has provided movements such as UAMSHO with an easy and far-reaching capacity to reach a more youthful and diverse group of Zanzibaris who identify themselves in terms of neo-fundamentalist ideology.

Summary

In this chapter I presented data, analysis and discussion regarding the role of new global technologies in the rise of UAMSHO as Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement. The individuals I interviewed identified technology as a key aspect of globalization; however it was a big positive for them, and a key resource for their organizing. I laid out the importance of technology to UAMSHO in terms of mobilizing and recruiting new members. Further, UAMSHO activists agreed that globalization aided by technology has enhanced their ability to communicate and reach their supporters easily. Therefore, new global technologies in Zanzibar plays a major role in political mobilization and radicalization, as the internet and use of mobile phones have increasingly afforded Muslims in Zanzibar ability to study the Qur'an and participate in various religious activities as provided by these more militant and neo-fundamentalist organizations.

CHAPTER 7

“CONVERT FOR THE SAKE OF ISLAM”: RELIGION, POLITICS, RACE AND NATIONALISM IN UAMSHO IDENTITY

In this chapter I will present my findings, analysis and discussion regarding how the aspects of globalization discussed in previous chapters affected the collective identity of UAMSHO. I explore the relationship between religion, politics, race and nationalism in this “new” Islamic organization in Zanzibar. While religion, politics, race and nationalism are interrelated in the construction of their identity, I find that their identity of religion, Islamic neo-fundamentalism, overshadows racial differences as they organize politically.

Religion and Political identity

Data from the interviews I conducted in Zanzibar indicated that religion and politics go hand in hand for these activists. To be honest, I was not surprised by this finding, although I did not know its extent until the interviews in 2004. They identify themselves primarily by their religious connection and not political affiliation, even though at the time I interviewed them, they were a part of Civic United Front (CUF). At the same time, they articulated many grievances in political and nationalist terms. They identify the opposing political party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as the enemy, both because they too closely affiliated to mainland Tanzania and because they are Christian and have oppressed Islam. The UAMSHO activists I spoke with expressed a strong desire first for independence, and then to reform Zanzibari society by means

of strict Islamic beliefs. They believe this will bring about change in societal morals, social norms, laws, and eventually resolve their lack of political power. UAMSHO members regard themselves as traditionally oriented, not modernized, as they stand ready to fight the Union Government with Tanzania for Zanzibar's self-rule.

Mahmoud, an active UAMSHO member and local missionary, clearly articulated the relationship between Zanzibari identity and religion in his message to "convert for the sake of Islam":

For sure our many Muslim brothers and sisters are in a fight with a mass of infidels trying to paint a bad name to our religion and even attempting in destroying Islam, therefore my friend, my job is to visit every mosque and preach regarding Islam, the message is simple, convert for the sake of Zanzibar. Brother, I have been in Raiwind, Pakistan two times that is where I learned how to be a tabligh [preacher] at an Islamic school. [He wears traditional Pakistani clothing and a turban]. My job is to help spread the fundamentalist ideology by pleading with my brothers and sisters to be fervent plus joining in the struggle against these infidels and what this globalization has brought to our nation.

Mahmoud sentiment regarding the role and relationship between Islam, as religion, political identity was the same as for most activists. Of the activists, I spoke with, 82.5 percent (33 out of 40) consider Islam to a great extent to be a political ideology as well as a religion. Ninety percent of activists I interviewed in 2004 (36 out of 40) told me that Islam shapes their attitude and outlook regarding their identity and who they are as a nation. Activists pointed to the fact that Islam as a religion is inseparable from politics and was instrumental in the evolution of Zanzibar nationalism during the colonial period. UAMSHO sees themselves as a catalyst for the new wave of a nationalist resistance to Zanzibar's union with mainland Tanzania as they are not benefiting from it. I will discuss nationalist Zanzibari identity in another section below.

Other scholars depict neo-fundamentalism as a reactive political movement against Western style modernization. This neo-fundamentalism is carried out by the urban poor, intellectuals, and traditional people. In my research, I found UAMSHO leaders to be outspoken, especially regarding their dislike of the Union and external influences to whom they attribute all of the evils of Zanzibar society. In addition, the UAMSHO leadership was not very happy when the Union Government rejected Zanzibar's desire to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly known as the Organization of Islamic Conference. The joining of OIC would have been a significant boost to UAMSHO's quest to secede from the Union and to establish Islam as Zanzibar's official religion.

UAMSHO activists see the ills of globalization as they experience it, as tied to CCM politics. Clerics and UAMSHO activists' claim that many of the social freedoms that can currently be observed in Zanzibar are a result of the CCM government's bad policies and governance. It was CCM, they claim, that allowed the ills of globalization to infect their society. Abdul, a very active member of UAMSHO, told me the following in response to my question of why the movement focuses on fighting globalization:

In the name of globalization many things have happened. Zanzibar has been a dump of all evils; prostitution, drugs, theft and alcoholism is rampant nowadays as the youth have nowhere to run to, the Union government does not want to do anything, rather bringing more foreign investors who do not hire our own people, which does not help at all. Zanzibar used to be a very good place, people had morals then, but since the globalization story, things have changed, and thus this is why we are working hard to return our country to its religious roots.

They call on all Muslims to return to the principles of their religion and reclaim Zanzibar by getting rid of the Union. At the same time, as I pointed out in a previous chapter, activists were happy that globalization connected them to the Muslim world as their only hope of

furthering the political goals of their movement. As I showed in the chapter on foreign aid and investment, scholarships funded by Mid-East donors and investors allowed them to study Islam outside of Zanzibar. They specifically named Saudi Arabia and Sudan as places where they had learned a radical form of Islam, the Wahhabism. Again, this is significant because it enhanced the ability of UAMSHO activists to connect with the outside world cheaply and in real time and further fundamentalist ideals. How activists combine religion, political goals and the critique of globalization can be summed up by the following quote from Rama, a UAMSHO official that I spoke with in 2004:

People talk a lot about Islamic State, yes, it is ideal, but for me the time for that is yet to come. For that to happen we have to go through all stages we can't skip stages, we need to follow the Qur'an and what our religion teaches us, we need to stand on that first. Who will stand for the social accountability that is lacking? For a fact, we can't depend on CCM government that is like a revolving door for all freedoms just because of the 'globalization-everything goes' attitude. Zanzibar was never like this before all this globalization nonsense, look at our children and people who do not value our culture, should we fight for what is right? I think we should, but first we need to get away from Tanganyika, that is the first colonial master to get rid of right now.

As I pointed out, most activists pointed to globalization as a force that has sustained UAMSHO through connection to the Muslim world for financial help and technologies. These connections developed their identity with their religion as the center of all aspects of their lives and how it can return Zanzibar back to the basics.

Summing up UAMSHO's feelings regarding the role of religion in society during open air lecture at Dimani, in April 22, 2012, Sheikh Msellem, an influential UAMSHO cleric, stated:

All things in life have to be directed by Islam. Islam is the only religion that shows humanity how to do things in a godly manner, so that our deeds can be accepted by God. Even Suleiman and David ruled their people following God's ways, worked according to God's will and not randomly. We can't refuse God in every way and allow this rampant and evil ways of life to control our lives and not follow God's authority; we have an opportunity to follow God's will that is written in Quran by following the leaders with Islamic wisdom. Muslims around the world have this unique

opportunity to connect and reconnect through technology, and follow God's ways. This is to say that, we, the clerics are the ones supposed to be the leaders, and show the mass how to follow God's will.

Further, he added:

The respect of our country lies with the full implementation of our religion and sharia law. Our religion is the one and only to lead us out of this mess, that is going on right now, if we take seriously the fundamentals of our religion and become pure, then we can take the political responsibilities ahead of us, the way God wants us to be.... good keepers of this land, good leaders. All the great leaders like Prophet Muhammad S.A.W were pious and followed the fundamentals of our religion.

My discussions with activists confirmed that Islam plays a major role in politics, as mosques and open air religious lectures are being used as primary political platforms. The activists repeatedly told me that Islam is the last religion where Allah sent the Angel Gabriel to instruct the Prophet Mohamed regarding the Islamic teachings. Therefore, approximately 92.5% (37 out of 40 interviewed) of these stated that they follow the Qur'an and pray 5 times a day, and view Qur'an as the basis of everything in their lives i.e., knowledge regarding laws governing their lives, the economy, family life, politics, social life and worshipping. A good example is what a popular UAMSHO cleric named Hamdani told me regarding the importance of religion and politics being one, and its implications for the union between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania:

Islam is political, everything is stipulated clearly in the Qur'an, the union wasn't mentioned anywhere in the Qur'an, is something that is nonexistent, you can't find anything related to the union of any country in the Qur'an or hadith of Prophet Muhammad (Stories written of the Prophet). Otherwise God hasn't directed us in regards to anything to do with the union, it's just a colonization by Tanganyika. This confirms to us that the union is illegal, we want self-rule, we want our country back. When our country is under sharia law and our leader follows the Qur'an, then our political landscape will be peaceful and our people will benefit, therefore you cannot separate between our religion and political life, they are one in the same.

Further, UAMSHO's political demands have been tabled by CUF as too contentious. For example, UAMSHO proposed that Zanzibar join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and demanded parity between Mainland and Zanzibar. The activists made clear that their faith allows them to demand their rights. Daima, a UAMSHO activist I spoke with in 2004, expressed that Islam allows him to stand up for himself and for his brothers and sisters. He wants Zanzibar to have a true democracy that offers opportunity for all, not one controlled by mainland

Tanzania:

Mr. D, even Christianity allows for struggles like this...how many Christian wars have been fought? People are easy to pinpoint Jihad, but all religions to me sound the same, fortunate to me I chose Islam! My religious belief (Islam) allows me to struggle for my rights.... precisely democracy and better life. Again, I don't see any difference between Politics and Religion, they have the same course, bringing about social change for better, my belief is part and parcel of which I am now and what I stand for, hence struggle comes within my belief!

Then he added:

This movement has obligations to safeguard Zanzibar and its people. You see, Zanzibar has been dominated a lot by Mainland Tanzania and I believe the mainlanders need to refrain from interfering with our issues, they need to leave Zanzibar alone, they are Christians anyway, dominated us for 50 years, this is Islamic Country, we need self-rule considering their partner CCM in Zanzibar just follow what the mainlanders decide for us, and this puts us in a bad position, a no-win position. It is about time for that to change.

Amina, another active UAMSHO activist, also pointed out that Islam does not distinguish between matters of religion and politics, as both go hand in hand. She stated that her belief does not imprison her but rather allows her to participate fully in political activities. She explained that it is UAMSHO's obligation to wake up the ones who are still sleeping or lagging behind, to take back their country. In addition, she spoke of using her religion, as a road map to accomplish good deeds on earth, including being a good citizen. Hence, her role is to persuade

others to convert and follow the principles of Islam and serve their country diligently. This is what she told me:

To me religion and politics, particularly Islam they go hand in hand, each one has its own limitations; my belief doesn't imprison me to participate fully in political activities. That being said, it is our obligation to wake up the masses from their somber sleep, Islam is our road map to accomplish a lot here on earth and life after death, no any other religion can be that...so if you don't want to convert and follow our principles then get out of here, we have an obligation to ensure that if you are awoken, then you convert. This process will be very easy when we take over the powers of our government and self-rule.




Figure 6: One of many pictures I took around Zanzibar town showing political graffiti on a wall in Stone Town.

Isa, a UAMSHO cleric, said this regarding the role of religion and its relationship to politics:

Islam as a religion is political, whoever says that religion and politics are different, then that person is foolish and does not have an understanding of Qur'an and is ready to be robbed of their rights. Islam is the true politics; even Prophet Muhammad started his own political rule that was organized through religion. Islam is supposed to control and run the political life of any country. Islam controls and directs all Muslims in every aspect of their lives i.e. ruling the

country, eating, sleeping, even when it comes to using the bathroom. If you leave politics to control the people, then people's rights will be violated. All leaders who separate religion and politics, they are hypocrites who are trying to mislead the masses.

Additionally, Abdulrahman, UAMSHO's high official, described to me the importance of religion and politics being on an equal level. He pointed out that they believe that all the principles of life are found in the Qur'an, hence when they speak about 'principles' they refer to the whole democratic process from how to elect officials and to how elected officials should govern the people. Here is some of what he told me:

I'm a Muslim, very proud one, I pray five times a day, and my religion since its inception has thrived to change people's lives for the better, and there is no difference in this circumstance, we Zanzibaris are in. At times, we have to accept that religion is not about peaceful resolutions and obedience all the time, but sometimes it takes new tactics to achieve a better and prosperous life. All God wanted is to make everyone live a better life. The poverty and other life disasters are human creation; I don't want to be more technical on that, rest assured that we will fight, our action is to fight for our rights, jihad can be anywhere, and it's a fight of every Muslim!

Further, he accused the current Zanzibari government of not following the principles of Islam because of the Christian-dominated Union with mainland Tanzania. He looks forward to the day when Zanzibar secedes and gets rid of all the infidels.

Furthermore, Jabir spoke passionately regarding the importance of Islam in Zanzibar society and how it helps to counter the so called the 'pollution' from the West:

Islam Religion is healthy to our society because it keeps us in check by not allowing the pollution of society with things from the West, especially the United States of America. At the same time our political manifesto draws from the religion and therefore keeps the society in check from all other evils brought by the so-called "models of development" from the West. The racial issue is not as advertised, to me; they are just giving us a bad rap on that issue. We are all Zanzibaris, I don't think the Arabs, Africans, Indians issue really exist. Therefore, I really cannot comment anything further about it.

In stressing the importance of Islam in the political sphere in Zanzibar, Hamad, another UAMSHO activist, told me this:

We Muslims believe that the all the principles of life are found in the Qur'an. When we talk about 'principles' we refer to the whole democratic process from how to elect officials and how elected officials can govern the people fairly. However, as you can see our present government certainly doesn't follow all that, but we wish these principles written in the holy Qur'an could be used for effective governing. When we break from the dysfunctional Union, UAMSHO will be able to lead this country where it is supposed to be and get rid of all infidels.

Additionally, when responding to my question on how his political stance is shaped by his belief in Islam, Hamad said:

As I said before, to be where I am now, you have to follow the fundamentals of our religion to be in this group, precisely implies to the adherence of the doctrine of faith, the original principles of Islamic polity (ummah), and to the central doctrines governing the legitimacy of power (sharia)! So that's how I have been shaped politically with my religion, now you can see why I say they are a two in one thing! And if I can add this, our group is the only one that can take Zanzibar where it is supposed to be. This country needs Islam, pure Islam and nothing less, for the betterment of our people, Islam is like a map...a road map, it will lead Zanzibar out of colonization to prosperity.

Religious education

As I said in chapter 5, the community-based religious schools (madrasas) have become prevalent in Zanzibar and play a key role in building their identity. They see these religious schools as important to bringing the ideologies of Wahhabism and other more radical forms of Islam to young children. Madrasas receive their funding mostly from Saudi Arabia NGOs that also supports UAMSHO and Wahhabism, a strict form of Islam. Therefore, UAMSHO draws from the same ideology as this more radical form of Islam that is being encouraged from the madrasas level. Hamidu, an UAMSHO activist who is very familiar with community religious schools, told me that these madrasas see to socialize children when they are young and throughout adolescence:

Brother, I can confirm to you this, I'm a Sunni but Wahhabism is fast catching up, as they have set up many madrasas financed by Islamic States, especially Saudi Arabia, which helps them to

mushroom quickly. They are very popular, I can say they attract parents easily with their brand new modernized buildings and it seems like it is working as it is a very influential brand of Islam. We can see changes in the community and the return of our religion, but most importantly when they give scholarships to the teachers and students to go to Saudi and other places like Sudan, when they return they have the right amount of energy and they want to change everything.

Clerics and missionaries active in UAMSHO often go door to door encouraging parents to send their children to the madrasas. UAMSHO's selling point when talking to the parents is that madrasas school fees are very low, and most of the time parents pay nothing. Additionally, these schools enable the children to learn both religious and secular ideas at the same place. In conversation, UAMSHO activists expressed their deep belief that they can reform Zanzibari society with appropriate Islamic beliefs, which will influence change in societal morals, social norms, laws, and politics. They emphasized that religious education is something they are very proud of, claiming that once young children start to understand the importance of Islam in their society, then the future of Zanzibar will be bright. UAMSHO not only uses madrasas as breeding ground but also as an engagement strategy to connect and energize their believers.

According to the literature on Islamic neo-fundamentalism, fundamentalism manifests itself as a strategy by which stressed and struggling believers try to protect their unique identity as a unit of people by returning to what they see as the original tenets of their religion.

When I spoke to Mahmoud, a local missionary with experience in Pakistan, he told me that one of his many engagement activities in the community is to go door-to-door preaching and attempt to convert or recruit new members to strengthen the movement:

For sure our many Muslim brother and sisters are in a fight with a mass of infidels trying to paint a bad name to our religion and even attempting to destroy Islam, therefore my friend, my job is to visit every mosque and preach regarding Islam, the message is simple, convert for the sake of Zanzibar. Brother, I have been in Raiwind, Pakistan two times, that is where I learned how to be a preacher at an Islamic school. (He wears traditional Pakistani clothing and a turban). My job is

to help spread the fundamentalist ideology by pleading with my brothers and sisters to be fervent plus joining in the struggle against these infidels and what this globalization has brought to our nation.

Religion and violence

These activists pointed out that they are willing to use violence for the sake of saving their country from destruction. UAMSHO activists pointed out that violence may be the fastest way Zanzibar can return to its glory days. UAMSHO clerics stressed to the importance of Islam connecting them back to the Muslim ummah, to fight the infidels, using violence if necessary, and secure Zanzibar from the colonization from the mainland Tanzania. This is what Amir Farid had to say regarding the role of violence in Zanzibar at an UAMSHO rally in April 22, 2012:

Muslim ummah wants their rights, not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, we want our rights now. The problem starts when the infidels' government doesn't want to give us our rights, the rights to self-rule, forgetting that our religion allows us to take those rights by force, using our own hands. We have to take our rights, we cannot wait for them to be handed over, no one will deliver our rights to us, we have to fight for them, we have to sacrifice ourselves and Allah will help us, it doesn't matter what it takes, we will use force, if bombing will make the process faster, then so be it, we have the know-how to have effective weapon(s), maybe we will get their attention.

Many of these activists also feel an obligation not only to protect Islam, but to eventually spread it. UAMSHO is aiming at taking control of the Zanzibar state, which will allow for a quicker spread of Islam in nearby Christian-dominated countries and for the introduction of sharia law in these countries that have been corrupted by Western values.



Figure 7: I took this picture on the outskirts of Zanzibar, a graffiti lending support to Osama bin Laden. This is an example of Muslim ummah, where a Muslim brother grievance is for all, especially if one is fighting the 'infidels'.

Most of the UAMSHO activists told me in 2004 that they follow what their clerics tell them to do, because they have to follow the fundamentals of their religion for Zanzibar to achieve self-rule. Once Zanzibar achieves its independence, it will be easy for the country to reach its potential and solve most of the societal issues it is currently facing. The activists insisted that they will do whatever is necessary to achieve independence, even using bombing to get the attention of the government. Most UAMSHO activists I interviewed thus expressed their support for Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups.

Race, religion and identity

In terms of race and ethnicity, 80% (32 out of 40) of UAMSHO members interviewed indicated that they do not have any race, that they identify themselves as Zanzibaris. When I asked activists about their race or identity, I received identical response from most of the activists, like what Juma told me:

[Frowning and seemed annoyed by the question] I don't have a race, I'm Zanzibari. I don't consider as being Shirazi, Ngazija, or any one of the tribes from the mainland. My great grandfather is from Yemen, my great grandmother is from the mainland, and my mom is from Comoro, so what does that make me to be? Zanzibari right? Yes, I have cousins, nieces and nephews in Yemen and they actively support us, but that is only half of me.... although sometimes to me, honestly, I consider myself as Zanzibari of Yemenite because of my relatives' connections there.

Nevertheless, there is a connection that they talk about in relation to their Arab identity. Rehema, one of only a few women active in the movement, told me this:

I'm sure you are going to have a difficult time getting a straight answer for that question. However, I will tell you this, most of us do not have a race or tribal identity, we consider ourselves as Zanzibaris, yes we have connection with our extended families elsewhere especially in the Arab world, but it's us here who are in the fight. I'm a Zanzibari, although my family is from Yemen that makes me an Arab Zanzibari [Smiling].

Thus, most activists are drawn to the movement not because of their race but rather because of their religion, in particular their Islamic neo-fundamentalist identity. Seventy percent of the activists I interviewed insisted on the importance of uniting individuals as Muslims in Zanzibar rather than as a part of a particular racial or ethnic group, in order to steer the country back to its religious roots. Here is what Mudi told me in 2004 when I interviewed him regarding his race:

I'm sure you are going to have a difficult time getting a straight answer for your question regarding race. I will tell you this, most of us do not have a race or a tribe here, there is no Shirazis, Ngazijas, Arabs, Indians or any identity that matter, we consider ourselves as Zanzibaris, yes we have connection with our extended families elsewhere especially in the Arab world, but it's us here who are in the fight. I'm a Zanzibari, although my family is from Yemen that makes me an Arab Zanzibari. [Smiling]

These concerns were further echoed by other activists, including Juma, another UAMSHO member:

Mr. Deo, as a member of our movement the number one thing is our faith, people know us for what we believe and follow. Islam as a religion comes first and that we complement it with our

actions. We as a group are always ready to surrender our all for the good of our faith and movement, even if it means to sacrifice our lives. Islam and its fundamentals make us strong and ready to achieve anything we are setting out to achieve, it's the only way to the true happiness and fulfillment in our lives. The old issue of what color of our skin or tribal standings have no chance; we have something bigger that unifies us, and everyone in our movement we stand together as one due to our religion.

Similarly, Aisha another UAMSHO activist, told me this:

Mr. Deo, we don't see ourselves in terms of race or tribes; we are one group and our faith comes first. We have been a home to diverse groups of people since before colonialism. People have been identifying themselves differently, first by tribes and then if you were an Arab or African, but my group focuses more on our religion as the center for everything. If you agree with the fundamentals of our religion, then you are with us and just like us. Where you come from or the color of your skin does not have a place in our movement.

Activists also told me that UAMSHO group doesn't regard race as important aspect of

UAMSHO. Hamisi, Another UAMSHO activist I spoke with told me this:

I don't have a race, I'm Zanzibari. Mr. D we don't have tribes or racial identities here like other places, most tribes have been diffused. How can I count myself as African, Arab, Shirazi or something else while I don't live or have any emotional connection with the original place/land and people with exception of few relatives? You see most of us are in this movement because its part and parcel of our lives here, we consider ourselves Zanzibaris and we want the best for this place and its people.



Figure 8: One of UAMSHO's rally with speech by popular cleric Sheikh Msellem drawing a large crowd in 2004.

Part of the reason for this erasure of racial conflicts has been because Islam addresses each Muslim as an individual, and not in terms of his group, clan, or his ethnicity. This view is widely reflected in the existing literature, as Jansen (1979), Tibi (1998), Schanzer (2002), Vertigans (2011), and Wright (1985) described. Abdul, a very active member of UAMSHO, told me:

We have to start small, rescuing Muslims one by one, addressing them as individuals and not like they are part of a large group. This way they will pay attention.

Again, Abdul alluding to the fact that the activists do not consider race or ethnicity is a factor in their movement and insisting on the importance of individualism rather than race and ethnicity.

Nationalism and Religious identity – Zanzibar independence

As noted above, my research found out that for UAMSHO activists use the concept of identity interchangeably with nationalism (we the Zanzibaris) hence to them identity and nationalism cannot be looked separately, as they identify themselves as Zanzibaris fighting for their nation, Zanzibar. The activists expressed that Islam as religion unites them at the same

time identify themselves as Zanzibaris and want to reclaim their country from what they call Tanganyika colonialism. Activists see the union between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar as evil and something that was not agreed upon by anybody except the two leaders with no referendum or citizens' consideration, this was just forced upon Zanzibaris in the name of African unity. In 2004, I spoke to Rama, UAMSHO's high official who spoke passionately regarding what UAMSHO sees as the important aspect that nationalism and identity seen as one:

We do not want this union with mainland Tanzania. This union was not something that we agreed on, there was no voting, we were not included, no referendums, there was absolutely no consensus on this matter, only two leaders agreed on this and imposed it for the sake of African union. If you pay attention from the time of implementing the union, we lost our autonomy, Zanzibar ceased to exist, we were robbed our political process, economy and even cultural. I'm telling you, you are surprised because the mainlanders robbed us even our language. Kiswahili originated from Zanzibar, now we are force to speak like the mainlanders, they are the ones who are setting rules and conditions on our language, we lost control of it and its growth.

This finding is corroborated in the literature as Saleh (2004) argue that the union was not a consensus of the people of two countries as it was agreed upon by Julius Nyerere, the then President of Tanganyika and Amani Abeid Karume, the then President of Zanzibar for the sake of Pan-Africanism. Saleh (2004) stress that one cannot differentiate the Union government and the mainland government as is one of the same. Therefore, what is referred as the Union government is in fact the mainland government, which is said to be dominating and rob Zanzibar its autonomy (Saleh 2004). Further, activists expressed their frustration that the mainland is working hard establishing its cultural domination by controlling the education system (Christian based), mass media and language.

It has become clear speaking to UAMSHO activists that the Union was formed on unstable ground, and is not improving, as the grievances of Zanzibar's people's make it weaker. As noted by Shivji (2008), challenges to the Union in its initial twenty years remained internally among government leaders. This time was marked by careful manipulation of the Union agreements and articles, as those on the mainland used every legal maneuver to contain Zanzibar under the thumb of the Union government. Thus, as Heilman and Kaiser (2002) point out, since the economic liberalization that took place in the 1990s in Tanzania only benefited a few, it is hardly surprising that political frustration was directed into religious extremist movements.

In capitalizing on the issue of Zanzibari nationalism and identity, UAMSHO's leadership uses popular well-known sheikhs and clerics at its public rallies, such as one Sheikh Msellem Ali¹. In one of his speeches at a rally on Mchangani beach, the Sheikh asked the audience if they liked the Union and its government, before preaching to the crowd on the difference between colony and protectorate, insisting that Zanzibar was a British Protectorate, while mainland Tanzania was a German colony. He pointed out the need for Zanzibar to have self-rule and remove itself from the so-called colonial rule of Tanzania:

The Tanganyika colonialist do not want to let us go, they are benefiting more from this relationship, they don't care that they have a large land mass with so much natural resources, but still they want to keep us under them. It is time for all of us to wake up and take control of our country –Zanzibar is a country, we are able to self-rule and control our own destiny. We are all Muslims, and we have the same belief that is not conforming to Tanganyika's morals and values: We can be good neighbors, but we shouldn't accept to be the same country.

¹ I decided to use his real name as his speeches are publicly available in different media, including YouTube.

Here, Sheikh Ali was employing populist rhetoric to explain his opposition to the Union, arguing that from the time of creation of the Union, the majority of Zanzibar people were not committed to it, and that the major issue of contention was that of sovereignty.



Figure 9: UAMSHO activists at a rally holding placards demanding sovereignty

Haji, a member of UAMSHO's top brass, told me essentially the same thing:

We want Zanzibar to be independent from Tanganyika and be able to independently carve our own path, our own independent education system, business dealings and the freedom to do what is important for all Zanzibaris without being subjected to the corruption and nonsense of the Union government.

The above quotes confirm what the literature on Zanzibar's politics contends, that the political landscape of Zanzibar is a volatile mix of politics and religion. Most of the activists felt that there is no difference between the two. Further, they claim that Zanzibar has been marginalized and enslaved for the past fifty years under the Union government and it is time to separate. This is what I wrote in my journal after a day in the field:

Politics in Zanzibar is very difficult/hard, emotionally charged and mixed with religion. There is not a fine line between politics and religion, as they are two things in one. People follow their hardline religious ways first, and then what will benefit them or the country and future

generations. Anything that is said in the name of religion by clerics/preachers or movement leaders then goes without even questioning. People attend rallies a lot, and follow every suggestion or request by the movement leaders. One of the things that I have witnessed here is "HOPE," people are hopeful for the future of Zanzibar, however, disappointments are vivid.

While UAMSHO has been emphasizing the importance of Zanzibar seceding from mainland Tanzania and ending the union between the two countries, it has also been working tirelessly to educate its followers to separate from established political parties that do not benefit them. This is specifically intended to publicly criticize the CUF, which had agreed to the government of National Unity in Zanzibar in 2010.

Haji, the high ranking UAMSHO official, speaking at the rally on Mchangani beach after Sheikh Ali, told his followers:

First, the freedom of our country from the Tanganyika colonial hands, then we will deal with political parties. We have reached a time for all those who love and treasure this country to come together. We should be ready to separate from the political parties and not allow them to divide us based on their smoke and mirrors political propaganda directed by the colonial master, Tanganyika, using her slave masters to divide and demoralize us in the name of the union. We know that the union is a colonial idea and we have to wage war against it with all our beings.

UAMSHO activists constantly expressed their deep desire to reform Zanzibar society with appropriate Islamic beliefs, which they feel will lead to change in societal morals, social norms, laws, and eventually alleviate their political and economic plight. UAMSHO members regard themselves as traditionally oriented, not modern and embrace a neo-fundamentalist ideology as the only way forward.

Summary

In this chapter, I discussed in detail the findings and analysis from primary-level coding that produced memo codes and secondary-level coding resulting with the theme -Islamic neo-fundamentalism, detailing the relationship between religion, politics, race and nationalism in this “new” Islamic organization in Zanzibar. I found Islamic neo-fundamentalism to be a central aspect of their identity. Activists expressed strong desire to reform Zanzibari society by means of strict Islamic beliefs. For activists, religion is an important aspect of their daily life and comes before anything else. I found that religion not only seems to be a unifier among the believers, but for many Zanzibaris it is the only way to take control of their country.

Further, the literature points to the role of globalization in changing how individuals identify themselves, at times revitalizing ethnic divisions that were dormant under the control of nation-states, as some individuals are looking for new identities. Zanzibari people have historically identified themselves in terms of their racial and ethnic background, a thing that has dominated the political landscape in the islands for decades. Before independence and the 1964 revolution, race and politics were at the forefront. Contrary to this, however, I found that the UAMSHO activists, identify themselves by their religion and not by their race. They see their religion as transcending race.

Further, it was clear that in 2004 UAMSHO activists saw religion as central to Zanzibari independence and nationalist identity, more so than their position in the political party CUF. It is clear that this religious identity allowed them to distance themselves from CUF when the CUF/CCM deal would be brokered six years later.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation set out to explore how specific aspects of globalization affect the growth and development of particular militant neo-fundamentalist social movements and in what ways globalization affect the resources and collective identity of these movements. To examine this, I conducted ethnographic and archival research and in-depth interviews with 40 activists in the UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group in Zanzibar, which is associated with the rise of violent activities since the first multiparty elections, held in 1995. Most of these activities have been associated with the UAMSHO (AWAKENING) group, that adheres to strict neo-fundamentalist views of Islam, and which calls for Zanzibar to secede from Tanzania, the union with the mainland.

The general focus of my research has been to gain an in-depth understanding how specific aspects of globalization contributed to UAMSHO's resources and collective identity. Analysis of my data showed two major aspects of the globalization process were important to my interviewees. These included: foreign aid and investment (Western and Mid-East investments); and new global technologies. I then examined how each of these affected the resources and identity of movement actors. I then addressed how foreign investments and investments by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) influenced and propelled UAMSHO. The next data chapter addressed the role of communication technologies in UAMSHO

development. And lastly, I addressed how these aspects of globalization affected the collective identity of UAMSHO.

Foreign aid and investment

This is one of the key aspects of globalization that the activists identified as important in explaining the resources and collective identity of UAMSHO as a militant neo-fundamentalist social movement. Foreign aid and investment in Zanzibar worked in two ways, one as a catalyst for the emergence of UAMSHO as it provided key source of grievances, which motivated the activists to action. Secondly, the investment by key NGOs from Mid-East states was instrumental in setting up a structure and framework for organizations to spread political Islam, where faith is combined with material reward that is appealing to the poor. This was very important as the resources provided by the NGOs propelled the evolution of UAMSHO from modest religious group to a militant-neo-fundamentalist organization.

Technology

The activists I spoke with identified modern information technology as a very important aspect that helped UAMSHO transformation from modest religious social movement to a militant neo-fundamentalist social movement. I found out that UAMSHO used modern technology for as a resource and for recruitment purposes. The new information technology has been instrumental in helping UAMSHO activists enhance their ability to communicate and reach their supporters with ease. Technology has played an integral role in affording the

activists ability to study the Qur'an and increase their participation in different religious activities more often leading to a better political mobilization and radicalization.

Islamic neo-fundamentalism

Islamic neo-fundamentalism is at the forefront of UAMSHO's identity, where I found that has direct relationship with the way they linked their religion with politics, race and nationalism. UAMSHO activists expressed to me a deep desire to reform the Zanzibari society by means of instilling strict Islamic beliefs. Therefore, to activists, religion is the foundation of their daily life and encompassing everything while comes before anything else. Further, Zanzibaris have historically identified themselves in terms of their racial and ethnic background, however the activists expressed that their race is not as an important part of their identity as their religion. They felt that they were able to unify a variety of races and "tribes" based on their common bond in neo-fundamentalist belief in Islam. Additionally, UAMSHO activists saw religion as important aspect to Zanzibar's independence from the Union with mainland, Tanzania and not political position within CUF. Hence, the religious identity allowed UAMSHO activists to distance themselves from CUF when they agreed to the government of national unity with CCM.

The Ambiguous Legacy of Globalization in Zanzibar

Existing literature on globalization emphasizes both the positive/integrative and negative/fragmenting consequences of globalization around the world. In terms of the positive view of globalization, Tibi (1998) stresses the importance of globalization specifically in its role

of shrinking the world into a village with a faster paced movement of goods and people as a new and better way of supporting the universal objectives of economic collaboration, civic society, and good governance. My study found that UAMSHO activists do indeed enjoy some of the positive consequences of globalization, as they are more easily connected with their brothers and sisters in other parts of the world, specifically in Saudi Arabia and Oman, from whom they get financial help.

Additionally, activists also expressed the importance of being connected to the rest of the world and in particular the Muslim world. In this case, globalization is seen as an integrative factor, helping the emerging economies around the world to become a part of global trade and capital flow (Dicken 1998, Castells 1996). That being said, my informants feel a connection with not only their Muslim brothers and sisters but recognize the benefit of enjoying ties to the larger world economy, although this brings with it Western cultural and economic influences. The activists I interviewed in 2004 spoke of their recently renewed ties with Arab countries, specifically Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia, where they get opportunities for religious education, while their personal experiences through family ties is also renewed.

I wrote in my reflective journal that those Arab countries that had previously supported the CUF were vigorously renewing ties with UAMSHO and are keeping the movement moving forward. Some activists have been able to visit places like Oman, Sudan and UAE with the support from individuals, organizations or Arab States. Also, the activists spoke glowingly of the benefits of globalization, which enhances their connection with diaspora. Most Arab Zanzibaris have decided to maintain ties with other family members who decided to stay behind after the revolution, and that most of them who originally joined the CUF have since stopped supporting

that party and moved to UAMSHO. Many of the activists were able to learn new tactics from new information technologies. The internet especially has helped with their movement strategies, eventually helping returning Zanzibar to its religious roots. This is what Mahmoud, one of the high-ranking official of UAMSHO, said when speaking of the benefits of globalization:

I didn't mean to paint globalization as a bad thing, there are some good things, including it's much easier to communicate with our brothers around the world cheaper and faster, we get out wire transfers quickly and we don't need to travel anywhere, we can get everything fast right here.

On the other hand, Klein (1999) point out that globalization has become a vehicle for spreading consumer culture, driven by large corporations spreading westernization, specifically Americanization. In this study, I found that many activists similarly identify the forces of globalization as the primary source of societal decay, western and American cultural influence and other societal ills, e.g., rampant corruption, prostitution, drugs, and alcoholism. Claiming to represent what regular Zanzibaris feel, the activists I interviewed argued that globalization encourages the disregard of local customs, values, and morals. UAMSHO leadership has encouraged this belief, claiming that visitors, specifically tourists, do not respect local culture and customs, and dress or act inappropriately, therefore disrespecting Zanzibaris. Here is what Hamidu, another UAMSHO high official, told me about how most of the activists feel when it comes to visitors keeping up with Zanzibar's morals and values:

Mr. Deo, the truth is, if I come to your home, I have to follow the rules of your house. The people who visit here do not cover themselves up, women walk naked and people kiss in the streets. That is not what we want to show our children. They need to cover themselves up and other things do not need to be in public. People who are visiting here should respect us. I see this as a lack of respect and they destroy our values and morals. I call this as a lack of respect because people visit Saudi Arabia and other Arabian countries without disrespecting them, you will not find people walking naked in the streets, why then they do it here?

This view was violently manifested when two men in a moped threw acid at two volunteers British teenagers in 2013 and a bomb exploded in 2014 at a popular tourist bar in Zanzibar (AFP, BBC, Reuters and Xinhua 2013;2014).

Further, Mazrui (2001) argued that an important aspect of globalization is the constant use of economic powers by the powerful countries to enter the economies of developing countries. This creates unequal relationships between developed and developing economies due to the heavy presence of either multinational corporations or other forms of investment, and in the case of Zanzibar, heavy investment in tourism industry. Therefore, on one hand, this is a positive aspect of economic globalization, as on the surface tourism industry provides employment and helps in other economies of scale specifically for artisans and traders. However, UAMSHO activists view globalization and foreign investment negatively because the benefits of tourism do not trickle down to most people. Many people still live in poverty without basic necessities. The tourism industry in Zanzibar draws its workforce from mainland, Tanzania and other East African countries specifically Kenya. Tourism has been taunted as the door to better Zanzibar with improved infrastructure and public services that will benefit all, however to UAMSHO this is not true as most of them do not see the benefits of the industry.

As I have pointed earlier that UAMSHO activists see globalization as important in connecting them to the outside world and helped them with mobilizing financial resources around the world, but also as a source of discontent, UAMSHO has used their religion platform to mobilize all Muslims in Zanzibar and denounce what they called evils of globalization and the union with mainland, Tanzania. UAMSHO clerics have used mosques and open air lectures as platforms to discuss the plight of Muslims. While on the surface, the lectures are oriented to

spiritual renewal, they also serve to politically mobilize Muslims in Zanzibar (Chande 2000). Therefore, as I have pointed earlier, religion to UAMSHO activists' provides a key basis for the group's collective identity that helps unite members and defines the movement's goals, including Zanzibar self-governance and secession from the union with the mainland, Tanzania.

This accurately demonstrates the contradiction of globalization to Zanzibar. As I have discussed in this research, globalization has shaped UAMSHO activism and Zanzibaris at large. Simultaneously, globalization has been blamed for many of Zanzibar's ills and helped UAMSHO in terms of mobilization of resources and collective identity. Globalization has afforded most Zanzibaris an easy access to the benefits of being interconnected around the world. They are able to see, read, and witness events around the globe in real time, and make it easy for them to imitate (Hughes 2000 and Waters 1995). Subsequently, globalization is a two-fold phenomenon, first a historical process and second an ideological project, where interconnectedness among different countries and cultures in terms of shrinkage of space and time due to advancement in communication and transport technologies have fastened the flows of capital, commodities, ideas, and cultural values. This has helped with the growth of not only transnational social movement organizations around the world but also localized social movement organizations. That being said, militant religious social movement organizations and international terrorism is increasing and expanding around the world, and Zanzibar is no exception.

Therefore, in the context of political turmoil and economic challenges, resource flows from both public and private coffers associated with Middle Eastern States, indelibly shaped UAMSHO's collective identity and mobilization patterns to increasingly emphasize revolutionary

Islamic neo-fundamentalism. Further, this has accentuated the current strengths of militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement organizations such as UAMSHO potentials of drawing the empathy of apathetic individuals willing to fight for a cause.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Although this study was conducted judiciously, I am cognizant of its limitations and weaknesses. First, due to government scrutiny towards anyone who associated with UAMSHO, it was very difficult for me to move around freely and conduct research or associate with activists in the open, which hindered my ethnographic observations in the field. As Whyte (1943), Anderson (1999), Duneier (1999) point out, ethnographic observation is important and helps frame the setting adequately. Furthermore, at times when I was conducting interviews with my informants, I felt some of them were not completely honest in their responses. This might have been contributed to the fact that some of the activists did not completely trust me. I wrote in my journal that I was disappointed during my first week in Zanzibar as I felt that my informants that I interviewed were not open to provide me with honest information.

Additionally, my ethnographic observations became progressively hard as the fear of political instability and violence spread in Zanzibar. On the other hand, it was often difficult to obtain necessary documents such as economic and financial reports, charters, and policy statements of the UAMSHO group.

Further, I had difficulties obtaining other documents, such as reports on Zanzibar's social, economic, and political conditions, due to government red tape, fear of government employees of being associated with UAMSHO, as well as the corrupt nature of the document

gatekeepers who will do anything to hinder the request unless you pay them. Also, the libraries where I attempted to search for these documents often lacked resources (i.e., copiers, papers, ink), or the documents themselves were missing pages due to having been ripped out of their binders.

Second, the interviews for this research project were conducted in Kiswahili, activists' and this researcher's native language. After the recorded interviews, I transcribed them and later translated them into English. Through this process, a great deal of original expression was lost due to difficulties of finding the actual words in English to represent the activists' original meaning. To avoid confusing the reader, I have attempted to translate the interviews in a way that the quotes can be as close to natural spoken English words as possible without altering the meaning of what the activists said.

Third, most of the data collection for this research was conducted over three months, due to a lack of funding, which was not enough time to fully explore all the factors that have propelled UAMSHO to become a militant Islamic neo-fundamentalist social movement organization. It will require a longer period to examine in greater detail the behaviors of neo-fundamentalist actors such as UAMSHO, especially regarding their notion of traditional Islamic virtues, as well as the backgrounds of the activists.

Future research might also look more closely at the similarities between groups like UAMSHO and other social movements. Also, a closer investigation of the ties between UAMSHO and the governments and NGOs of Islamic countries such as Sudan and Saudi Arabia would help to understand how such movements can rise and spread so quickly.

Appendix A
Institutional Review Board (IRB)

DESCRIPTION OF STUDY

NAME: Dr. Barb Brents & Deo Mshigeni

DEPARTMENT: Sociology

TITLE OF STUDY: The Islamic Youth Movements of Zanzibar

Subjects

We plan to interview between 30 and 40 adult activists of the youth wing of the Civic United front, a political party in Zanzibar. The sample will be recruited through personal referrals of the members of the youth wing of the Civic United Front political party, party officials, bureaucrats and if necessary a purposive sampling strategies to get equal number of women and men to participate in the research. These interviews will supplement archival and secondary research materials.

Purpose, Methods and Procedures

This research examines the origins and current trajectory of the youth movement² on Zanzibar so as to determine the interactions between external organizations and social movements and class, race, ethnic and religious and generational identities of youth in Zanzibar.

Due to the increased infusion of radical Islam among youth in Zanzibar, there is a clear need to examine the impact of religion on youth movements in Zanzibar. This is an exciting opportunity to examine the relationship between ethnic identity, religion, global politics and social movements, at this important juncture of the Arab and African worlds. Zanzibar is a perfect place to study these movements, because of the ethnic mix between Arabs and indigenous Africans, the role of Islam as a religion and the role long-standing conflicts between the two ethnic groups play in people's daily life on these islands. Important sociological questions we are concerned with in this research are; What are expressed discourses of conflict in Zanzibar and how do they reflect race, ethnicity and religion? How are the political parties using youth

² In Tanzanian culture 'youth' is considered age 18 to 40. However, for someone to join a youth wing of a political party they should be aged 25 and above.

contingents? What role does an increasingly organized world Islamicist movements play in the mobilization of Zanzibarian youth?

Primarily, the research will rely on analyses of archival documents both in the U.S. and Tanzania. Further data will be gathered using face-to-face semi-structured interviews of approximately 30-40 youth activists between the ages of 25-40 years³, party officials and bureaucrats. We will attempt to generate equal numbers of male and female participants through a purposive sampling strategy.

Interviews will last approximately half an hour to one hour and focus on activists' own definitions and explanations of meaning or strategies of youth movements of Zanzibar. Interviews of party officials and bureaucrats will focus on the background information and perceptions of the activists. Where necessary, these interviews will be audiotaped in their native language (Kiswahili) and transcribed for later analysis. In this case, because one of the researchers is a native of Tanzania and speaks the language, it will be easy to blend-in and get the necessary information and connection needed to complete the research. In addition to the in-depth interviews, participants will provide a core set of demographic information that will help target in-depth interview questions. (These demographic questions will include age, race or ethnicity, formal education level, list of formal or informal organization membership, socio-economic status and family size).

Benefits

There are no financial or any other benefits to the participants of this study. However, the study will shed light on the Arab and African ethnic relations and also will add knowledge and understanding of social movements, ethnic and religious conflicts in Zanzibar.

Risks and Confidentiality

The risks to the participants of this study are minimal and the sociological information to be gained far outweighs any potential harm. The only possible risk might be to activists interviewed and the risk would largely result from disclosure of their identity. To protect the adult activists, who will take part on our research, we will shield the identities of each person interviewed during the course of the research. We will not use participants' names or any other identifying information in any part of this research. However, there may be cases where a participant may be unwilling to sign the informed consent; this is due to the sensitivity of some

³ Ibid;

of the participants to having their identities revealed due to the nature of their positions in the movements or political parties. The subjects might not be ready to sign the informed consent, but may be ready to share their experiences with the researchers. Their participation is essential for the success of this project. Therefore we request permission to waive written consent and seek verbal consent in this instance. According to the Assurance certificate program, in international research this is acceptable practice and lack of waiver may mitigate risk not only to the researchers but also to the participants.

The audiotapes and transcriptions of the interviews will contain no names and will be kept in a locked cabinet in the department of Sociology offices. Names of the respondents and information that links them to each interview will be locked in a separate cabinet in the department offices. However, while in Tanzania we will store the tapes and notes in a secured hotel safe.

Any research on social movement might pose minimal dangers to the investigators. In this particular case, the main interviewer is a native of Tanzania speaks Swahili (native language) and has experience necessary in researching in Zanzibar. Further, the researcher has connections in Zanzibar, and has lived, schooled and has the cultural experiences in the region which will lead to smooth blend in and minimal endangering others and the researcher.

Informed Consent

The consent procedure will take place prior to each interview. After a brief explanation of the research and interview procedures in participants' native language, the participants will be asked to sign a Consent Form (see appendix A) and given a copy of the form for future reference. However, for the case of participants unwilling to sign the informed consent waiver, we will administer verbal consent, which will be given at the start of audiotape and they will get a copy of the consent form for future reference.

Appendix B
INFORMED CONSENT

Title of Study: The Radical Islamic Youth Movements of Zanzibar

Investigator(s): Dr. Barb Brents & Deo Mshigeni

Protocol Number:

We Dr. Barbara Brents & Deo Mshigeni are social science researchers from the Sociology department at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

We would like to invite you to take part in our research, which concerns the youth movements of Zanzibar. We are interested in learning more about the origins and current trajectory of the radical Islamic youth movements in Zanzibar, as well as the relationship between the ethnic identity, religion, global politics and social movements as an important intersection between Arab and African worlds in Zanzibar.

If you agree to take part in this research, we will conduct an interview with you at the time and place of your choice. The interview should last about half an hour or more. With your permission, we will audiotape the interview. We expect to conduct only one interview, although follow-ups may be needed for additional information. If so, with your permission, we will contact you again by phone or email.

There may be no direct benefits to you as a participant in this study. However, we hope the study will shed light and understanding of the character of Zanzibaris youth movements.

There are risks involved in all research studies. This study may include minimal risks i.e. you may be uncomfortable when answering some questions. There will be no financial costs to you other than time cost involved to participate in this research, which will be approximately one hour. You will not be compensated for your time.

We will keep your identity confidential. We will not use your name or other identifying information in any reports of this research. We will store the tape recording and notes in a locked cabinet in the department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas for three years and after that will be destroyed. While in Tanzania we will store the tapes and notes in a

secured hotel safe. The confidentiality guarantees given here will apply to this research and any future researches relying on these materials.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. You are free to refuse to take part. You may decline to answer any questions and may stop taking part in the study at anytime.

If you have any questions about this research, please don't hesitate to call us, Dr. Brents or Mr. Mshigeni, at (001) (702) 895-3322. If you agree to be part of this research, please sign the form below. For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints or comments regarding the manner in which this study is being conducted you may contact the UNLV Office for the Protection of Research Subjects at (001) (702) 895 2794. Please keep the other copy of this agreement for future reference.

I have read this consent form and agree to take part in this research.

Keep this copy for your records

Appendix C

RUHUSA YA MAHOJIANO

Jina la Utafiti: Umoja wa Vijana wa Kiislamu wa Zanzibar na Vugu Vugu la Ulimwengu la Kisiasa na Kidini

Watafiti: Dk. Barb Brents na Ndg. Deo Mshigeni

Namba ya Jarida:

Sisi, Dk. Barbara Brents na Ndg. Deo Mshigeni ni watafiti was sayansi ya jamii kutoka idara ya soshologia ya Chuo Kikuu cha Nevada, Las Vegas.

Tungependa kukuaribisha kwenye mahojiano maalumu kuhusiana na utafiti wa umoja wa vikundi vya Vijana wa kiislamu. Tungependa kujifunza Zaidi kuhusu mizizi na hali ya sasa hivi ya vugu vugu la kisiasa kwa vijana wa kiislamu na mahusiano yao na itikadi za kikabila, dini, na siasa za ulimwengu na hapa Zanzibar.

Kama utakubaliana nasi na kushiriki kwenye mahojiano haya, tutafanya nawe siku, saa na sehemu uipendayo. Mahojiano yatachukua takribani nusu saa ama Zaidi. Kwa ruksa yako, tutakurekodi kwenye kaseti. Tunategemea kufanya majojiano haya kwa mara moja tu, ingawaje kunawezekana kuwepo na ufuatiliaji zaidi kwa vipengele ambavyo havitaeleweka. Tafadhali fahamu kuwa haya yote yatafanyika kwa ruksa na ukubali wako.

Hakuna faida yoyote ama malipo kwa mahojiano haya. Mahojiano haya yatatuwezesha sisi watafiti na wewe mhojiwa kupata mwangaza zaidi juu ya vikundi vya vijana vya kidini na vuguvugu la kisiasa hapa Zanzibar. Hata hivyo hakuna utafiti wowote wa kisayansi ama kijamii usio na madhara. Utafiti huu una madhara kidogo sana ambayo yanawezekana kutokea pale wewe utakapojisikia vibaya kujibu swali ama maswali kadhaa ama kuzungumza ana kwa ana na mtafiti. Hakuna gharama zozote za kifedha kwa mahojiano haya, zaidi gharama ni muda wako usiozidi saa moja. Hakuna malipo kwa mahojiano haya kwa hilo saa moja.

Tutaweka nyaraka zote za utafiti huu kwa siri. Kwenye utafiti huu hatutatumia jina lako halisi ama namna yoyote ile ya kukutambulisha. Tutatunza nakala za kaseti na nyaraka nyinginezo kwa miaka 3 kwenye makabati maalumu yenye kufuli, kasha baada ya miaka 3 kuchoma nyaraka hizo pale Chuo Kikuu cha Nevada, Las Vegas. Kwa wakati huu tukiwa hapa Zanzibar kuendesha utafiti huu, tutatunza nyaraka hizi kwenye makabati maalumu ya nyaraka ya hoteli. Usiri ambao umewekwa bayana hapa utatukima kwenye utafiti huu na mwingineo wowote wenye mahusiano na huu huko mbeleni.

Ushiriki wako kwenye utafiti huu ni wa hiyari. Una ruhusa kukataa kushiriki ama kujibu swali ama maswali na wakati wowote unawe kuamua kujitoa kushiriki kwenye mahojiano au utafiti huu.

Kama una maswali yoyote juu ya utafiti huu, tafadhali usisite kuwasiliana nasi; Dk. Brents ama ndg. Mshigeni kwa kutupigia simu namba (001)(702)895-3322. Kama utakubali kushiriki kwenye

utafiti huu basi saina hii fomu hapo chini. Kwa maswali kuhusiana na haki za watafitwa, ama kama kuna malalamiko ama mapendekezo kuhusiana na namna utafiti huu ulivyoendeshwa usisite kupiga simu namba (001) (702) 895-2497 ofisi ya kulinda haki za watafitwa ya Chuo Kikuu cha Nevada, Las Vegas.

Nimesoma na kuielewa fomu hii na kwa hiyari yangu nakubali kushiriki kwenye utafiti huu.

Tunza nakala hii kwa ajili yako

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